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ABSTRACT:

Governments, although increasingly faced with decision-making on
matters which involve a significant technical content, appear illequipped to cope with this and have come to rely on advice from experts.
The establishment-fQjl the Australian National Animal Health Laboratory
provides an example of technology decision-making by governments, using
expert advisors.
A number of investigations into ANAHL were carried out from 1964
and these led to a Parliamentary Public Works Committee Inquiry in 1974.
The technical nature of the proposal allowed the decision making to be
defined as scientific, however, it is argued that the institutions committed to the establishment of ANAHL and their perceptions and
definitions of need and their value judgements determined the nature of
the decisions reached.

Furthermore it is argued that these decisions

had been made prior to the PWC Inquiry and that its purpose was to
legitimate these decisions.

As a result of controversy, shifts of

emphasis and changes in the arguments justifying ANAHL were made by the
proponents.

This, however, served to highlight the uncertainties and

value-judgements in the arguments and eventually led to a questioning of
the credibility of the decision-making institutions and the proponents
of ANAHL.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION
A Theoretical Framework
Technology, defined in its widest sense as a tool, a technique or a
social organisation or process, is an integral part of m o d e m society
and is inseparable from the social, economic or political structure of
that society.
The success of government collaboration with science during World
i

War II led to increased government support of scientific inquiry.

This

new government commitment was generally directed towards solving
specific problems, often military, and these mission-oriented
organisations represented "a major institutionalisation of science and
technology as a formal tool for achieving government policy and
corporate development."^
The large capital investment required and the high risk involved in
the development of a new technology resulted in governments assuming the
role of promoters of technology. But as well as having a direct
influence as a technology customer in areas such as defence, energy,
transportation, health, etc., governments have also affected the growth
of the role of technology indirectly by providing incentives for private
investment, by regulations of safety, environmental quality and business
practices and by underwriting social overheads in support of scientific
2
research and specialised education.

Governments may promote technology

in particular sectors in order to realise various national goal s^

but

not only is technology used to fulfil well defined needs, but social
4
needs and values are themselves built and shaped by technology.
The technological determinist model, which views technology as

developing of its own accord and imposing itself on society, is clearly
inadequate.

Technology is not neutral, nor is it accidental or

inevitable, but rather it is the outcome of particular choices.
Although this may seem apparent in the case of military technology,
where governments select particular technologies to achieve specific
ends, it may be less obvious in other areas.
In addition to^atsessing the consequences of a particular
technology it is necessary to examine who selects and in whose interest
technologies are selected, and to discover the economic, political and
ideological considerations on which these choices are based.

Problems Posed for Governments
Wynne argues that
"whereas technology is usually regarded as a
(neutral) means, to social ends defined
independently, one hopes, by democratic political
institutions; in reality the complex, hugely costly,
committed and powerful institutions set up as the
organisational embodiment of technological means,
gradually come to define social goals in terms of
"needs" for major public investments in a particular
form of transport, or energy technology, etc. And
their perception of need - their definition of social
values - naturally reflects tbeir commitments, since
that is their raison d'etre."
Once it is recognised that technology is not a neutral means to certain
ends, it becomes necessary to ask not only what the consequences of a
given technology are, but what were the reasons for its development and
what interests are represented.^
Wenk points out that "by definition, decisions involve a choice of
one alternative over another, but because choices can be more easily
made of 'how' than on 'what', much of what passes for policy deals far

more with means than with ends."^

Governments tend to respond to

initiatives, finding means for certain ends, rather than developing
g
significant new issues,

and these ends or goals are normally defined

by agencies committed to particular technologies or industries.

The way

these institutions perceive and define need reflects their commitments
and definition of social value, thus assessment of need becomes a
"vehicle of advocac>^^fether than an impartial analysis".^

i

Furthermore, Wynne points out that usually only a single technology
is evaluated in the decision-making process thus avoiding the question
of relative benefits, "a more overtly political question."^So not only
is the goal itself not questioned critically, but other ways of
achieving this goal, along with their costs, both economic and social,
are not investigated.
Often the goal is stated very imprecisely so that it becomes
difficult to criticise and show that this may not be the most effective
way of meeting those objectives.^^ As well as this, Collingridge claims
12
that objectives can be changed to protect a decision made in the past,
and if a project "is found not to serve its original objective, an
13
objective is invented which it does serve."
It could be argued that governments are ill-equipped to make
decisions regarding technology because of the complexity and
increasingly scientific nature of the proposals.

In some instances this

has resulted in the credibility of the institution involved being
assessed rather than the technology itself. As Wynne says,
"impartiality, accountability and social identification become key
factors." 14 In other cases, advisors or experts are introduced into the

assessment procedure to provide the expertise that governments lack.

The Role of Experts
The increasing complexity of, and dependence on, technology, and
the widening intelligibility gap between experts on the one hand and
decision-makers and general public on the other, has increased the
dependence of decisionmakers on experts.

However the need for experts

implies that scientific knowledge is neutral and decisions are
scientific or technical rather than political.

^

This view ignores the

fact that experts often define the decision-making problem

15

and that

problem formulation, data collection and analysis, and implementation
16

are all value-laden.

Although scientists are at pains to stress their

objectivity, their detached, impersonal open-minded gathering of
evidence, they in fact have political views and biases and personal or
professional interests at stake.

Mazur also suggests that the political

context affects the way scientists present their findings and hence
their influence on decisions,^^ and Ronge states "scientific advice
transferred to the political decision-making system inevitably18 undergoes
transformation - it receives a political 'mark' and meaning."
The objectivity and neutrality of scientific and technical truths
can be called into question by the existence of opposing experts.

If

experts disagree and one side cannot simply be shows to be wrong then
the existence of the disagreement indicates that interpretations and
value judgements play a significant role in the scientific enterprise.
Disputes among experts 19can become a major source of confusion for policy
makers and the public.
Part of the confusion is due to the distinction that is often made

between the informational and decision-making aspects of technology
assessment.

However, not only are the perspectives of the decision

maker important in deciding what information is relevant, but the
perspective of the expert and thus the information he presents is also
important.
Weinberg proposed the term "trans-science" for those questions at
the interface between'^cience and politics which can be stated in
i

scientific terms but which are "in principle beyond the proficiency of
science to answer".

He claims that scientific truth can be established

by peer review but where trans-science is involved "wisdom (rather than
20
truth) must be arrived at by some other mechanism".
Experts maintain their position and hence their influence through
their control of and access to specialized knowledge.

However Elliott

and Elliott point out that experts themselves lack any independent power
but instead serve the already dominant groups and institutions of
society,21 and Ronge claims that "serving political institutions does
22
not per se imply to serve society".
The goals of science cannot be taken as a source of definition of
23
social goals

just as the public interest cannot be assumed to be

identical to the interest of the bureaucrats and industrialists.
Primack and Von Hippie claim that there is a tendency for
governments to select advisors who have political views similar to the
officials they are advising and, as a result, politically
useful
24
conclusions are encouraged and usually received.
The use of experts is in itself a political act, and scientific
knowledge is used as a rational basis for substantive planning and to

legitimate decisions.

The assumption that scientific knowledge is

rational because it is based on objective data gathered through rational
procedures allows policy makers to define decisions as technical rather
than political.

Decision Making
Decision making^c^ften involves dealing with uncertainty where,
although all the possible outcomes or states of nature are identi-^iable,
adequate factual information about them is not available.

Collingridge

claims however that technology decision making involves decision making
26

under ignorance.

He argues that because of the nature of technology,

the effects are inevitably unforeseeable and therefore all the relevant
states of nature cannot be identified.

This means it is not possible,to

guarantee freedom from error or even to assess a decision as rational or
irrational since new information may become available which would
indicate that a different decision could have been made to achieve the
defined objective.

This ignorance is usually not acknowledged by

decision makers who emphasise the "factual" and "scientific" nature of
decisions. Wynne claims that the "way in which technical, social and
values-uncertainties are defined, concealed or confused is a key aspect 27
of the relations of power which are exercised in technology assessment."^
By using "spurious images of certainty" decision makers or advisors are
28
able to "gain authority on specific decisions and issues."
One way that decision makers conceal or confuse uncertainty or
ignorance is to focus on questions of risk and cost, which "can be
phrased in more factual terms" and hasten to skim over questions about
benefit and need which "by definition raise the latent and more

difficult questions of social values more or less directly."
But even the notion of risk and cost can be problemmatic.
divides the assessment of risk into two activities;

Lowrance

that of measuring

risks, an empirical scientific activity, and judging safety, a normative

30
political activity.

But this overlooks the fact that risks have to be

identified before they can be measured, and the liklihood of their
occurrence and their magnitude have to be estimated, an activity often
involving considerable uncertainty and interpretation.

As Conrad points

out
"the distinction between the estimation and evaluation of risks ... is misleading in its claim to
identify and quantify risks in a neutral and
- objective way, leaving the problem of evaluation to
an independent secondary s t e p . " ^ !
Thus it becomes apparent that risk assessment is not an objective,
neutral activity but is dependent on the social perception of risk.
Lowrance identifies a number of factors which influence this perception;
the risk is borne voluntarily or involuntarily, the effect is immediate
or delayed, there are no other alternatives or many alternatives, the
risk is known with certainty or unknown, exposure is a luxury or
essential, it involves a common hazard or a dread hazard, the
consequences are reversible or irreversible, it will be used as intended

32
or likely to be misused.

Although these are useful categories, they

fail to take account of the fact that acceptability or risk is dependent
on specific circumstances and is judged differently by individuals.
Furthermore Conrad points out that the
"imposition of risk on others (decisions on
technological risks are never made by the group
exposed to the risks) can be interpreted as a form of
oppression, regardless of the subjective
understanding of any of the agents."

In his analysis of political decision-making, Ronge introduces a
two-dimensional concept which focuses on the interrelationship of the
political system and the economic system. The political system no longer
appears the central decision-making agency in his analysis and he
identifies the following determinants of political decision making.
1.

The political system is by no means autonomous in choosing its
i

tasks and ends.
2.

It is more reactive in character than active.

There are not only general (human), but also specific informational
limits affecting political decision-making, which mainly result
from the decentralised structure of capitalist economy to which
\

policy-making refers and is bound.
3.

The political system.is basically dependent on fiscal resources to
be extracted from the production process (growth dividend).

This

extractability is not unlimited, and this fact results in various
determinations of political decision-making.
4.

Another limitation of political decision-making stems from the ever
precarious power base of the political system.

It has to execute

its decision and although the system is also producing

34

legitimation, social compliance cannot be regarded as unlimited.
Often more than one institution or group is involved in decision
making and Gibbons recognises this in his notion of the technology
assessment system which he sees as comprising "those social groups which
are (or should be) concerned with developing a given technological
programme." ^^

The elements of the system need not be formally bound and

can vary with the technology under consideration.
Gibbons then takes the analysis a step further and identifies three

classes of actor within the technology assessment system.

These classes

are "distinguished by their degree of involvement with the development
of a technological capability."

The main actors, or core actors, are

only few but are "intimately and continuously involved in the process of
development".

On the next level are supporting actors who "may have an

interest in one or more aspects of the development of a given technology
but by and large they affect it only tangentially."

The third grgup

consists of those who "should be but are not involved in the technology
assessment process." ^^ It would seem that often the members of this
group could only be recognised in retrospect, and then only if the
technology or the decision-making surrounding it were called into
question.

Gibbons recognises that this group is most likely to be ill-

organised and financially weak and therefore unable, realistically to
participate in decision making.

But as well a this they may be unaware

of the decision making or its consequences and therefore may only appear
as opponents after decision making has occurred.

This disadvantages

them further since they then have to fight for a reversal or at least an
amendment of a decision already established.
So an analysis of technology decision making involves consideration
of those groups involved in the decision-making process and their
perceptions, goals and influence.

But as well as this, there needs to be

consideration of the wider political and economic factors and
recognition of the uncertainty and ignorance involved in the process.
An example of decision-making within the realm of government on a
matter of significant technical content is provided by ANAHL.

The

technical nature of the proposal allowed the interested parties to

define the decision-making as scientific.

In this way value judgements

and uncertainties were able to be concealed by the scientific arguments
of the experts.

However the experts and advisors were committed to the

establishment of ANAHL, and their perceptions and value judgements had a
considerable effect on the decisions reached.

An examination of the

decision-making process with regard to ANAHL should therefore provide
insights into the political nature of technology decision-making.

A HISTORY OF ANAHL^^
The history of ANAHL officially began with the Eichhorn Report of
1964.

Dr Eichhorn, a research officer of the US Department of

Agriculture, was appointed counterpart-in-charge of the Palo Alto
Diagnostic and Vaccine Production Institute during the Mexican/USA Footand-Mouth Disease eradication campaign, which began in 1947.

He was

subsequently the first^ti^rector of the Pan-American FMD Center, Rio de
*

Janeiro (1952-55).

When he visited Australia, he was a senior

veterinarian in the Animal Production Branch of the Food and Agriculture
38
Organisation of the United Nations (FAO).
According to CSIRO reports and publications, Dr Eichhorn's visit
was at the invitation of the Department of Health.

However, Dr

Kesteven, who was at that time Director of the Animal Production and
Health Division of FAO, claimed that "moves were initiated in 1964 at
the request of the late Mr A. Maiden (then Secretary of the Department
of Primary Industry) to request FAO to send the late Dr E. A. Eichhorn
to Australia to draw up a plan to protect this continent from the
disease." ^^
Regardless of whoever instigated this visit, the outcome was a
recommendation that Australia establish its own maximum security
laboratory to provide diagnostic and vaccine testing and production
facilities in the event of an outbreak of exotic disease.
40
Dr Kesteven also claimed

that he undertook action to establish a

National Animal Health Laboratory when he returned to Australia in 1969;
however, an Inter-Departmental Commmittee (IDC) and a Commonwealth States
Veterinary Committee (CSVC) Working Party had already been set up to

investigate the need for such a facility.
The CSYC, which was established in 1968, formed a Working Party
whose terms of reference included an investigation of the desirability
of, and need for, a maximum security animal health laboratory, its
functions, siting and staffing.

Its recommendations, supporting the

establishment of such a facility, were presented to the Standing
Committee on Agricul^re (SCA) in January 1970 and to the Australian
Agricultural Council (AAC) in February 1970.

The AAC was established in

1934 and comprises the Federal Minister and State Ministers for
Agriculture and its Standing Committee (SCA) comprises

enior officers

from those bodies.
Independently of the CSVC, ttie Minister of Health set up an IDC
made up of members from the Commonwealth Government Departments of
Health, Primary Industry and Treasury and the CSIRO.

'

Its

recommendations, which were in general agreement with those of the DSVC,
were presented to the SCA in June 1970 and to the AAC in July 1970.
At the July meeting of the AAC, the SCA recommended that because of
the great national importance of these proposals, a panel should be
formed, comprising senior representatives of the States to consult with
the Commonwealth.

This Panel met in August, formed an eleven-man

Advisory Proposal Committee which in turn formed a Proposal Evaluation
Team

(PET).

Between October 1970 and December 1970, the members of PET

visited fifteen overseas laboratories.

The PET Report was published in

1972 and this report formed the basis of a joint submission by the
Ministers for Education and Science, Health, and Primary Industry to the
Commonwealth Government.

In October 1972 the Commonwealth Government

agreed in principle to the establishment of a maximum security animal
health laboratory.
A further joint submission to the Government was made in 1973 by
the Ministers for Science, Health, Primary Industry and Northern
Development.

This submission was accompanied by the CSIRO Proposal for

a National Animal Health Laboratory Report of May 1973 and an
Environmental Impact Study produced by the CSIRO and the Department of
Works in October 1973.

The Government approved the selection of .the
*

Geelong site in April 1974 and in July 1974 the proposal was referred to
the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Public Works (PWC) by the House
of Representatives.
The ten years from 1964 to 1974 could be considered a period of
pre-hi story, involving various groups and committees and numerous
reports and recommendations, but all outside the public arena.

The next

period from 1974 to 1980, although still involving insider groups and
committees, takes on a more public aspect through the direct
participation of Parliament.
A public inquiry was held at Geelong in September 1974 by the PWC
and the recommendations and conclusions contained in its report to
Parliament were:
i. There is a need to establish a maximum security Animal Health
Laboratory to ensure the prompt and reliable diagnosis of exotic
animal diseases,
ii. The proposal is economically justified,
iii. The "box within a box" principal of design of the Laboratory will
ensure microbiological security,
iv. The proposed functions of the Laboratory are appropriate.

V. The precautions taken to prevent the escape of infectious disease
viruses have been based on and are an improvement on measures which
have been successful in a number of similar laboratores overseas,
vi. After a suitable proving period the Laboratory should be authorised
to handle foot and mouth disease virus prior to an outbreak of the
disease in this country.
vii. The site selec?t,€|pl is suitable.
viii.

The Committee recommend the construction of the work in tllis
reference.

ix. The Committee consider that the construction and establishment of
41
the Laboratory should proceed as a matter of urgency.
This Report was accepted in its entirety when submitted to the
Parliament in late 1974.
Although a public hearing, only one private citizen, whose property
was adjacent to the proposed site, entered a submission.

Otherwise the

hearing was dominated by the CSIRO, the Department of Health, the
Department of Housing and Construction and the Bureau of Agricultural
Economics.

The Australian National Cattle Council and the Australian

Veterinary Association sent written submissions only.
In 1977, the CSIRO and Department of Housing and Construction
reviewed the project and in November 1977 the Government approved the
rearrangement of buildings.
After the discovery of a Bluetongue virus in Northern Australia in
November 1977, four major primary producer organisations presented a
submission to the Government calling for the immediate commencement of
42
construction of ANAHL.

Although the PWC in 1974 concluded that construction should proceed
as a matter of urgency, building did not begun until March 1978.
In December 1979, the Government decided to accelerate construction
by one year at an additional cost of $7 million.

This followed an exotic

disease scare at Legana in Tasmania, where pigs developed symptoms of a
vesicular disease.
In 1978 the ANAHL Consultative Committee was established by the
Ministers for Health, Primary Industry and Science and Technology, to
advise the CSIRO Executive on all matters pertaining to the program and
operations of ANAHL.

In 1979 this Committee recommended that ANAHL

should undertake research on and development of FMD vaccines, which
would involve the introduction of FMD virus prior to an outbreak of the
disease in Australia.
This proposal was put to the Animal Health Committee (formerly the
CSVC) and the SCA and eventually the AAC itself.

The AAC endorsed the

introduction of live FMD virus prior to an outbreak in February 1980.
The CSIRO Executive then advised the Minister for Science and the
Environment that it would be in the national interest for ANAHL to have
access to FMD virus in advance of an outbreak.

The Minister for Science

and the Environment sought the support of the Ministers for Primary
Industry and Health in July 1980 and together they approached the Prime
Minister, who endorsed this recommendation in November 1980.
This decision heralded the start of much greater public involvement
and controversy.

Although triggered by the decision to import live FMD

virus prior to an outbreak, the controversy extended to a questioning of
the need for and the functions of ANAHL.
Prior consultation with interested groups had not occurred and it

was generally not known that such a decision had been approved.

The

first recorded public criticism of this decision was made by Professor
B. Morris, Head of the Department of Immunology at the John Curtin
School of Medical Research, ANU, in April 1981 at the Annual Conference
of the Cattle Council of Australia.

The debate was then extended to

include primary producers and their organisations, scientists,
veterinarians and évèntually the general public.
In an attempt to resolve some of the conflict, the National'Farmers
Federation with the aid of the CSIRO arranged an ANAHL Forum at Geelong
in August 1982.

Meanwhile in May 1982 the Australian Science and

Technology Council (ASTEC) decided to undertake a study of ANAHL.

When

it became apparent that the ANAHL Forum had not resolved the major
issues, ASTEC presented their report to the Prime Minister in Decemb'er
1982.
In October 1982 the Australian Academy of Science undertook a
similar study and both these reports were tabled in Parliament in May
1983.

The findings of both these reports, that FMD virus should not be

imported into Australia, formed the basis of the recommendations of the
Minister for Science and Technology which were adopted by the Labor
Caucus in May 1983.
Although this decision settled the question of live FMD virus
importation for the time being, the larger questions of the future of
ANAHL, its functions and the role of the CSIRO have yet to be answered.
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AN OVERVIEW
The Australian National Animal Health Laboratory has been the
subject of numerous investigation and reports during its long history.
More recently it has been the subject of widespread debate. The
technological nature of the project and the government involvement in
its development make it an ideal subject for an examination of the role
of governments in technology decision-making.
The PWC Inquiry of September 1974 provides a central focus for this
i

study. There are several reasons for this.

Although there were a number

of investigations in the ten years after the initial proposal to
establish a maximum security animal health laboratory in 1974, the PWC
Inquiry provided a public record of previous recommendations, a
rationalisation of these recommendations and directly involved the
Government in decision maicing through its Parliamentary Standing
Committee.

Because of its public nature, the PWC Inquiry provided

insights into the process of technology assessment and decision making,
as well as the role played by experts and advisors.
The

PWC

Inquiry also provided a reference point

which questioned the need for, and the role of, ANAHL.

in

later debates

The

recommendations and conclusions which were reached by the PWC Committee
were:
1.

There is a need to establish a maximum security Animal Health
Laboratory to ensure the prompt and reliable diagnosis of exotic
animal diseases.

2.

The proposal is economically justified.

3.

The 'box within a box' principal of design of the Laboratory will

ensure microbiological security.
4.

The proposed functions of the Laboratory are appropriate.

5.

The precautions taken to prevent the escape of infectious disease
viruses have been based on and are an improvement on measures which
have been successful in a number of similar laboratories overseas.

6.

After a suitable proving period the Laboratory should be authorised
to handle foot and mouth disease virus prior to an outbreak in this
country.

7.

The site selected is suitable.

8.

The Committee recommend the construction of the work in this
reference.

9.

The estimated cost of the proposal when referred to the Committee
was $56 million.

10.

The reappraised estimate of cost as presented to the Committee is
$67 million.

11.

The Committee consider that the construction and establishment of
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the Laboratory should proceed as a matter of urgency.
These conclusions became authoritative statements and were often used

to legitimate later decisions.
The CSIRO claimed that "the first recorded doubts about ANAHL were
expressed by Dr A. K. Lascelles, the Chief of CSIRO's Division of 45
Animal
Health, in correspondence with a member of the Executive in 1976."
Whilst supporting the establishment of a "maximum-security facility
capable of providing the diagnostic backup in the event of an outbreak
of FMD, he [Dr Lascelles] expressed concern about expenditure on what he
saw as an unnecessarily large facility with broader functions than
disease diagnosis - expenditure that he foresaw as being in competition

with his Division's resource needs for research on diseases already
46
present in Australia."
The public debate about ANAHL was initiated by a decision to import
live FMD virus into Australia prior to an outbreak of the disease. In
April 1981, Professor B. Morris, at the Annual Conference of the Cattle
Council of Australia, questioned the need for, and the functions of
ANAHL.

This sparked off new interest and discussion on the role of

ANAHL and the use of live viruses especially amongst scientists and
*
primary producers, and eventually led to the ANAHL Forum in August 1982
where an attempt was made to resolve these questions.
Oust a the early 1970s was a time of extensive investigations of
the need and functions for ANAHL, so the early 1980s became a time of
extensive debate on the necessity and advisability of importing FMD
virus into Australia, and the recommendations of the PWC, that "After a
suitable proving period the Laboratory should be authorised to handle
foot and mouth disease virus prior to an outbreak of the disease in this
47
country",

was used extensively to legitimate that decision.

The question of live virus importation was settled in May 1983 when
the Government decided to ban importation for at least five years.
However by this time the controversy had extended to a public
questioning of the need for ANAHL and the appropriateness of its
functions.
The live virus issue, although worthy of detailed examination, is
outside the scope of this study.

However it is important to note the

following points:
1.

At the PWC Hearing all the submissions stated clearly that ANAHL

would not be working with live FMD virus prior to an outbreak.

The

justifications of the need for, and functions of, ANAHL were
therefore not dependent on FMDV being available.
2.

No justification for the PWC recommendation was given apart from
ANAHL being designed to cope with FMD virus.

3.

When moves were first made to alter the decision to import live
FMD, it was argued that ANAHL could not fulfil its functions
without the live virus.

So it would appear that, not only were the arguments justifying thé
introduction of live virus unsuccessful on that score, but they had the
unintended effect of calling into question the role of ANAHL.
In answer to a question in Federal Parliament in September 1983
regarding the future of ANAHL, Mr Barry Jones, Minister for Science and
Technology, replied:
of ANAHL."

"the Government is very concerned about the future

He also stated "the CSIRO is in a position of great

embarrassment about the future of ANAHL."

Mr Jones revealed that a

Ministerial Committee would be established immediately to consider the
48
future of ANAHL.

Two weeks later in Parliament Mr Jones stated: "Clearly
49

this Government has inherited a mess in regard to this situation."
In October 1983 the Government established the Fenner Committee to
advise on the best way of utilising the facilities of ANAHL.

Following

this announcement, Mr Barry Jones stated during an interview that there
has been a "fundamental shift of function" brought about by changes
in technology.

Although he recognised that ANAHL had a "fixed form"

which would limit new uses, he claimed that he would like to see it put
to the "widest variety of uses" that would give "best value for money".
Mr Jones stated in Parliament that three of the leaders of the

CSIRO (the Chairman, Dr Wild, Professor Craig and Dr Boardman) had
"conceded that, if we had known what we know now about the diagnostic
changes brought about by the technological revolution of the last
decade, the whole configuration of ANAHL would have been utterly
different and it would have been established at infinitely less cost."^^
Nearly twenty years ago it was claimed that Australia needed a
maximum security animal health laboratory.

The estimated cost in April

1974 was $56 million, in September 1974 it was $67 million and by
September 1983 $157 million had been spent on its construction.

Now in

1983, it seems no one is sure why we need it, and Australia has inherited
a $257 million facility without a function.
The PWC Inquiry provides a basis for the structure of this study.
Four of the major conclusions of the PWC Inquiry were:
1.

There is a need to establish a maximum security animal health
1aboratory.

2.

The proposal is economically justifiable.

3.

The proposed functions are appropriate;

and

CO

4.

The site selected is suitable.

These have been taken as the main decisions for analysis.

The

section dealing with the proposed functions of ANAHL has been subdivided
into diagnostic function, training function, research function and
vaccine production function, again following the PWC classification.
The analysis is not, however, restricted to decisions made at the
PWC Inquiry, but rather uses the arguments leading to these decisions as
standards by which to gauge changes of emphasis or shifts in arguments
over a period of time.

It seeks to examine the sorts of arguments

which were presented at various times, their v a l i d i t y and influence, and
the way in which particular s c i e n t i f i c arguments and evidence were
presented to support particular political outcomes.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE NEED FOR ANAHL

THE NEED FOR ANAHL
The establishment of a national animal health 1aboratory was
initially proposed as the means whereby Australia could protect its
livestock industry against exotic diseases. Although the Australian
Agricultural Council had established an FMD Committee in 1952 (this
later became the Exotic Diseases Sub-Committee of the Veterinary
Committee of the SCA), and visits to overseas exotic disease courses at
Plum Island USA and Grosse Island, Canada, by Government Veterinary
Officers began in 1963, it was not until Dr Eichhorn's visit in 1964
that a maximum-security diagnostic laboratory capable of producing and
testing FMD vaccine was recommended.

Dr Eichhorn was invited by the

Government to investigate and report on Australia's preparedness to dope
with outbreaks of exotic disease, however in view of his previous
position as counterpart-in-charge of the Palo Alto Diagnostic and
Vaccine Production Institute, his recommendation would not appear to be
unexpected.
A Working Party was established by the CSVC in 1968-69 to
"investigate and report on the desirability of, and the need for, a
facility in Australia for diagnosis and research of exotic diseases and
for the preparation of appropriate vaccines and in particular to report
on:
i. Functions of the laboratory
ii. The principles involved in the choice of
a)

site

b)

plans and facilities

iii. Staff required
iv. The overall control and supervision of the laboratory
V. The integration of animal quarantine with such a facility
vi. Any other related matters."^
One of its recommendations was that a maximum-security laboratory be
established in Australia.
The Inter-Departmental Committee, which was set up by the Minister
of Health, also met several times during that period of 1968-69 and
concluded that there was merit in the establishment of a laboratory that
would be capable of diagnosing exotic diseases, instructing
veterinarians in the control and field diagnosis of virus diseases and
testing material from an animal quarantine station, and that could carry
out research on indigenous Australian animal virus diseases.^
The findings of the CSVC Working Party and the IDC were submitted
to the AAC in February 1970 and July 1970 respectively, and the SCA
recommended to the AAC that a Panel, made up of senior representatives of
the States should be formed to consult with senior Commonwealth
officials, at a Ministerial level if necessary, regarding the protection
of livestock industries against exotic diseases.

This Panel under the

Chairmanship of the Secretary to the Department of Primary Industry met
in August 1970. The members of the Panel, apparently on the basis of the
CSVC and

IDC reports, agreed on the need for a maximum-security

laboratory and then went on to propose a number of functions for this
facility.
Although the original question of how Australia should protect
itself against exotic diseases would seem capable of being answered in a
number of ways, once Dr Eichhorn made his suggestion on the

establishment of a maximum-security laboratory, the wider question
appeared not to be addressed again.

The CSVC and IDC looked only at the

desirability and need for the laboratory and not at whether or not there
could be other ways of achieving this protection for Australia.

At the

PWC Hearing Dr Snowdon stated:
"if it is accepted that Australia should acquire the
capacity to undertake its own exotic disease diagnosis,
the only alternative to one Australian laboratory
such as proposed for ANAHL, is to provide separate
;
facilities in each of the States." ^
By the time the AAC Panel considered the question in 1970, the need
seemed assumed.

The Chairman of the AAC Panel then invited the CSIRO to

carry out a feasibility study.

For this purpose a Proposal Evaluation

Team (PET) was formed, consisting of representatives of the CSIRO, the
Department of Health and the Department of Housing and Construction, and
its objectives were:
i.

to determine the feasibility of establishing within Australia a
research, diagnostic, and vaccine safety and potency testing
laboratory together with a unit for producing FMD vaccine;

ii.

to estimate the approximate cost of establishing and running such a
laboratory.

The PET Report concluded that it would be feasible to construct a high
security laboratory in Australia that could carry out the proposed
functions without the risk of infective agents escaping.^
Although one of the terms of reference for the PWC Inquiry was to
investigate the need for a maximum-security animal health laboratory, it
is important to place this objective in an historical and political
context.

Already 10 years had elapsed since Dr Eichhorn's original

recommendation, and during that time various committees had examined the
proposal to establish such a laboratory.

The PET had spent three months

visiting overseas laboratories and their six volume report published in
1972 documented detailed design and site specifications.

The

Commonwealth Government in 1972 had agreed in principle to the
establishment of this laboratory and recommended that $200,000 be made
available for further investigations that were needed for the
preparation of complete design specifications.

In 1973 the CSIRO;

prepared a report on the proposed laboratory, and together with the
Department of Housing and Construction had also prepared an
environmental impact statement for the proposed site at Geelong.

In

April 1974, that is, five months prior to the PWC Hearing, the
Government:
i. approved the establishment of ANAHL on the Geelong Rifle Range
Site;
ii. agreed to the formation of a Consultative Committee to assist in
the management of ANAHL;
iii. had noted that the recurrent cost would be additional to the
CSIRO's budget requirements;

and

iv. had approved the documentation of the project by the Department of
Housing and Construction to the point where reference could be made
to the PWC.^
In view of these investigations and Government commitment, it is
not surprising that the question of need was not examined closely by the
PWC and that questions of the proposed functions and microbiological
security attracted greater attention.
The arguments used by the CSIRO at the PWC to promote a need for

ANAHL can be divided into two types.

The first type of argument focused

on the value of the livestock industry, its economic importance to
Australia and the likely cost of an exotic disease outbreak.

Dr Pierce

stated in his part of the CSIRO submission "There are many major
livestock diseases exotic to Australia which, if introduced, could have
devastating consequences for our livestock industries and for the
economy in general."^
•

He then went on to describe the actual costs and impact of several
types of animal diseases in various countries.

The evidence presented

was a description of what had happened elsewhere, yet at the end of this
section Dr Pierce stated "the reasons why Australia needs a maximumsecurity laboratory are apparent from what has already been said."^
However, a close examination of this information revealed no arguments,
implicit or explicit, of the need for ANAHL and in fact the opposite
conclusion could be drawn.

It is difficult to understand how this

information on the economic losses suffered by other countries through
outbreaks of exotic disease could be used as an argument in favour of
Australia establishing an animal health laboratory, especially when most
of the countries in these examples had their own laboratories at the

g

time of the outbreak.

In one example given

of an outbreak of FMD in

Britain, it was claimed that the cost of the 1967-8 outbreak was
probably between $70-$150 million, yet the maximum security FMD World
Reference Laboratory at Pirbright was well established at the time and
veterinarians were well acquainted with the disease.
The second type of argument used by the CSIRO concentrated on the
inadequacy of quarantine to protect Australia and the increasing risk of

an outbreak.

Dr Pierce stated "The quarantine service operated by the

Australian Department of Health has so far proved an effective barrier
against the accidental introduction of these diseases, but no quarantine
service, however efficient, can hope to provide an absolute guarantee
9
against their entry."

Dr Pierce then went on to explain that

Australia can no longer rely on its physical isolation with the advent
of fast air travel and as more people travel to Australia "the risk of
exotic diseases penetrating our quarantine barrier inevitably becomes
greater."
During cross-examination Senator Poyser (PWC Member) questioned this
assertion, indicated surprise that this was included in the CSIRO
Submission rather than the Department of Health submission, and asked "is
this an assessment of CSIRO in relation to this matter?"
the CSIRO replied:

Dr Allen for

"I think the simple fact is that it is one of the

points of observation which have a bearing on the need for this
laboratory and Section A is, of course, concerned with the need for the
laboratory and it is brought out there as one of the factors which is
widely recognised, I believe.

It does not represent a formal assessment

on our part, but it is a fact which I think most people are aware of and
it is fairly widely quoted." ^^
On the basis of this "widely quoted" observation Dr Pierce stated
in his submission that there is a "real and growing probability that an
exotic virus will, sooner or later, penetrate Australia's quarantine
barriers". ^^ However in the next paragraph he stated, "An Australian
National Animal Health Laboratory with maximum-security facility cannot
keep exotic diseases out of Australia;

that is not its purpose.

Rather

the Laboratory is an insurance against the day an outbreak of an exotic

disease occurs.

When that happens, the Laboratory will be a vital

factor in minimising the impact that such an outbreak could have on the
Australian economy.
The Department of Health submission also made reference, but only
briefly, to these two types of arguments.

In the introduction of their

submission it was pointed out that "Australia is now the world's largest
exporter of meat and has an increasing trade in livestock, both in the
i

numbers of animals exported and in the range of countries prepared to
import Australian stock.

This favourable situation is due in large

measure to the continued freedom of Australia from a number of serious
exotic diseases of animals."^"^
It-was also stated that "no system of quarantine is infal1ible".^^
But by and large, the Department of Health left this line of argument to
the CSIRO and instead concentrated on ANAHL's relationship to the high
security animal quarantine station on the Cocos Islands.

It was argued

that Australia's livestock industry was disadvantaged since strict
quarantine meant a "lack of access to the wider range of genetic
material in breeds and strains in other countries." ^^ The establishment
of ANAHL, it was argued, would facilitate importation of livestock from
overseas and would "permit full utilisation of the facilities of the
station and provide a substantial work programme for ANAHL." ^^
During questioning, Mr Gee, in his capacity as First Assistant
Director-General, Quarantine Division, Department of Health, elaborated
on this and extended the role of ANAHL to facilitating exportation as
well as importation.

He said:

"I think the establishment of the island quarantine
station which will permit us to import new genetic
breeds and multiply them in Australia will then allow
us to be an even greater exporter. For example,
there are breeds of cattle in Africa that nobody can
get access to because there is not a facility capable
of handling them. If we were able - through the
combination of our off-shore quarantine station and
this laboratory that we are discussing today - to
import say the Africander or Booran cattle from
Africa, clear them disease-free into the Australian
environment and multiply them for export then to
other countries which are never going to have the
capacity to get them safely, we are going to have a
real gold mine from the point of view of potential ^g
for the export of unusual breeds and useful breeds."

•

It would seem curious that the US, for example, had not taken
advantage of this "gold mine" given their quarantine stations, maximum
security laboratory at Plum Island and climatic conditions similar to
Australia.

Mr Gee's simplistic account fails to recognise that only

known and studied diseases can be identified, yet it is possible that
imported African cattle could introduce previously unknown diseases with
unknown effects in a new environment thus creating a potentially
disastrous situation.
Mr Gee was then questioned about the danger of an exotic disease
entering Australia.

Mr Garrick asked him what sort of extra precautions

he would like to see.

Mr Gee replied:

"I think that our precautions at the moment are
adequate. We get periodic problems through human
error, admittedly, which are very quickly brought to
our attention, but I think as air traffic increases
that we will require more staff to be able to handle
the people and their goods. ... The main answer I
think will be people to deal with the increased
numbers of passengers and increased numbers of
aeroplanes rather than involved and expensive
equipment or research." ^^
Mr Keogh then asked if Mr Gee could assure the Committee that the
Quarantine Division would be able to cope with an increased risk and Mr

Gee replied:

"I am sure that we can cope with the increased risk ... I

am satisfied that we will be able to effectively maintain our existing
20
quarantine security."
When Mr Keogh suggested that the CSIRO evidence made it appear that
the entry of FMD disease would be inevitable Mr Gee replied:
"No, I do not think that it is inevitable, but I
certainly would not be prepared to say there is
absolutely no risk. There is a continuing, although
small, risk in my opinion of FMD being imported into
the country. I think the risk is very low while we do
not permit the import of live animals or livestock
products from FMD infected countries ... the
probability of the disease being transmitted by shoes
and clothing to animals in a dose sufficiently high
to set up the infection and to initiate an outbreak,
I think is low ... I do not believe there is an
extremely high risk of the introduction of FMD."^^

^

It would appear that Mr Gee's replies seriously undermined the
CSIRO arguments regarding the increasing danger and inevitability of the
increasing risk,however this appeared to be ignored by the PWC when
discussing the need for ANAHL in their Report.

The Report began with

information about the size and value of the Australian livestock
industry, then discussed the inadequacy of the quarantine service, often
quoting directly from the CSIRO submission and concluded with the CSIRO
statement that "the risk of exotic disease penetrating our quarantine
barrier inevitably becomes greater.
Mr Gee's statement that "the risk [of FMD being imported into the
country] is very low while we do not permit the import of live animals
or livestock products from FMD infected countries"^^ also brought into
question the advisability of importing livestock, a point overlooked by
the PWC.

It could be argued that ANAHL's presence, by facilitating

importation of livestock from such places as Africa and Asia, could

increase the risk of an exotic disease outbreak, thereby weakening the
Department of Health's case.
The effectiveness of the arguments used by the CSIRO and the
Department of Health was reflected in the other submissions to the PWC.
The conclusion to the Australian National Cattlemen's Council read:
"The ANCC urges the Australian Government to proceed
with the construction of the ANAHL as expenditure of
the capital costs involved together with the
associated operating expenses represent a small cost
compared with the loss of revenue that would result
should FMD occur in this country. This Council urges
that construction commence on this laboratory as soon
as feasible and that every effort be made to complete
the laboratory within the specified time. With the
increase of frequency of air travel, risks will
continue in regards to the introduction of exotic
diseases and over the period that this laboratory is
under construction, the Australian livestock industry
will remain vulnerable.

•

This Council also welcomes the announcement
that an Animal Health Bureau is to be established to
coordinate all areas of animal health control. The
ANAHL being associated with the Animal Health Bureau
and the off-shore quarantine station will go a long
way to guarantee the economic viability of the
Australian cattle industry." 24
Although this used the argument of increasing risk, it concentrated
on the economic importance of the livestock industry and the potential
to increase its viability, to justify the need for ANAHL.
The Australian Veterinary Association submission, on the other
hand, supported the functions of the BAH and emphasised the risk
aspect, quoting Dr Pierce, that "the laboratory is an insurance
against the day an outbreak of exotic disease occurs." ^^ Apparently the
AVA, like the CSIRO, but unlike Mr Gee of the Quarantine Division,
believed an outbreak was inevitable.
The Geelong Regional Planning Authority, which is made up of two

representatives from the nine municipalities in the Geelong region and
financed directly by these municipalities, stated in its submission to
the PWC:

"[ANAHL] is considered essential not only to safeguard the

existing Australian livestock industry which had an estimated gross
value of production in 1972-73 of $3,000 million but also to ensure the
future development of the livestock industry via the use of ANAHL as a
progressive, dynamic and probing research laboratory."

.

Although the GRPA was anxious for ANAHL to be sited at Geelong, it
is interesting that they presented an argument of the need for the
laboratory to the PWC, a subject which would appear to be outside their
area of expertise.
Thé Department of Agriculture presented a submission entitled "The
Importance of the ANAHL for the Functioning of the Proposed Bureau of
Animal Health."

The functions of the Bureau were listed as:

1.

A national uniform disease recording and trace-back system.

2.

Planning and coordination of animal disease control programs.

3.

Epidemiology studies relating to necessary field of research.

4.

Determining priorities and planning disease control.

5.

Overseas reporting on animal disease in Australia.^^

It was claimed that "without such a maximum security health laboratory,
the Bureau would not be in a position to carry out many of its functions
28

efficiently and in some case not at all."

However it was not evident

from these functions, even when elaborated later in the submission, nor
was it explained, why a maximum security laboratory was necessary to
carry out this work.
Mr Kelly of th PWC Committee made the interesting observation

early in the hearing that
"it seems ... that we are tackling this problem
probably from the wrong way round in terms of time.
One would have thought that the proper way for the
machine to run would be to have the Animal Health
Bureau first and it would recommend the erection of
the Animal Health Laboratory, and then afterwards
would come the quarantine station.
But the way we
deal with it in Australia is that we have the
quarantine station first the laboratory second and the
Animal Health Bureau third."
This sequence of events was, however, used to advantage.

The

approval of the quarantine station, an infinitely less costly project,
cleared the way for and provided a justification of the need for ANAHL
and ANAHL in turn provided justification for establishing a Bureau of
Animal Health, a body which would usurp the duties of other government
departments.
In 1977, three years after the PWC Inquiry, work had not begun on
the construction of ANAHL.

A Bluetongue disease outbreak scare in

Northern Australia resulted in primary industry groups submitting a
document entitled "The Urgent Case" to the Government, calling for an
immediate start to construction.

This document again stressed the

economic importance of the livestock industry and relied heavily on the
arguments of the increasing risk of the introduction of exotic disease,
using the recent Bluetongue scare and figures on the number of
travellers to Australia to demonstrate this.

The primary industry

organisations stated "Livestock forms a major component of Australia's
export income.

This valuable facet of Australian trade and industry

must be protected."

They also strengthened the risk argument in their

claim that "we believe that the risks of a serious outbreak of an exotic
disease have increased to such a degree that it is not now a case of

' i f there is a serious outbreak in this country, but, rather, 'when'."^^
Although there have been criticisms of the functions, arguments
about the need for ANAHL have not been seriously challenged until
recently.

In the April 1982 Report "Live Exotic Disease Agents at

ANAHL" the CSIRO stated:

"The need for ANAHL and its functions were

firmly established in 1970 by the AAC and reaffirmed by the PWC in
1974." ^^
The ASTEC Report of December 1982, although critical of some of the
functions of ANAHL reaffirms the need for the facility using the ¿same
arguments of the value of the industry and the increasing danger of an
exotic disease entering Australia.

They claimed that "Australia needs a

microbiologically secure animal health laboratory and the underlying
rationale for ANAHL has not diminished since the concept was developed
in the early 1970's." ^^
Although Mr Gee, when representing the Quarantine Service,
disagreed with the CSIRO arguments of the inevitable risk of an exotic
disease being introduced, after assuming the position of Director of the
Bureau of Animal Health his views appeared to change.

He was reported

as saying that "quarantine could no longer completely protect Australia
against exotic animal d i s e a s e s " . I n a speech at the ANAHL Forum, he
stated "I do not consider that there is any real risk or any high risk
at all of FMD being introduced into Australia with live animals, but
there is a constant risk of it getting in with smuggled livestock
products.

Another risk, and I fear a greater one is that of sabotage.

This would appear to contradict his statements at the PWC Hearing
where he claimed that the Quarantine Service would be able to "handle
the people and the goods"

but that the greatest risk would come from

importing "live animals from FMD infected c o u n t r i e s . S i r William
Henderson confirmed this earlier view in his speech at the ANAHL Forum
when he stated, "By far the most frequent way that FMD disease is spread
38

is by movement of livestock."
The threat of sabotage was a new weapon in the armoury of the ANAHL
proponents.

Later in the ANAHL Forum, Dr Snowdon (now Officer-in-Charge

of ANAHL) also referred to sabotage stating, "an assessment of the threat
to ANAHL from groups both within and outside Australia has been made
by
i
Australia's security organisation. It was concluded that at present
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there were no significant threats from either groups."
It is interesting to speculate why Mr Gee introduced the
possibility if it had already been investigated and dismissed.

Its use

as an argument would seem to add credence to Dr Gibbs
40 suggestion that
the proponents were "trying to scare the farmers".
It would appear that there was often a confusion of arguments and
unwarranted extensions made to the arguments of the need for ANAHL.
The importance and economic value of the livestock industry to Australia
may provide excellent grounds for justifying some action to protect it,
but this in no way implies that ANAHL is the only answer, or indeed an
answer at all.
There also appeared to be some confusion about the meaning of
"protect Australia's livestock industries".

This phrase was often used

to suggest that ANAHL could prevent an outbreak occurring, leading to
claims that ANAHL is "essential to safeguard""^^ the livestock industry and
"to maintain its position with meat-importing countries as a diseasefree area","^^ whereas what was being claimed was that ANAHL would be a

"factor in minimising the impact that such an outbreak could have on the
e c o n o m y " . ( T h e contentious nature of this claim will be examined in a
later section.)

But if, as the CSIRO pointed out, ANAHL "cannot keep

exotic diseases out of Australia",^^ a statement that was often overlooked,
then ANAHL could only be justified as a protector of the livestock
industry if it was demonstrated that an outbreak was likely to occur.
It is perhaps relevant at this time to point out that Australia has
not had an outbreak of FMD since 1872 , rabies since 1867 or Rinderpest
since 1923.

Contagious bovine pi euro-pneumonia, which entered Australia
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in 1858 was eradicated in 1967.

The Consultative Committee of the AAC,

which meets only in the face of a suspected disease situation has met
only four times in the last twenty 46
years;
mild strain of Newcastle disease",

in 1966 in regard to a "very

in 1973 for what was incorrectly

thought to be a disease in horses, in 1977 when the non-virulent
Bluetongue virus was discovered in Northern Australia and in 1982 for
the Legana pig incident in Tasmania.
The only evidence given by the CSIRO to support their argument that
an outbreak is inevitable was the increased speed of travel and the
increasing number of travellers to Australia.
John Fisher^^

However an article by

suggested that the relative dryness and high levels of

direct sun in Australia provide a natural barrier to epidemic infection.
He argued that if this were not so, we should have experienced large
outbreaks in the Nineteenth Century when stock was imported from the
United Kingdom and quarantine was less stringent.
This view was also held by M. J. Howell, Senior Lecturer in Zoology
at the Australian National University.

In a letter to the Canberra

Times he stated "one of the most curious aspects about FMD virus is that

it is not already established in Australia, given 200 years of
colonisation from epidemic foci in Europe and the widespread
introduction of livestock in the early years of settlement ... It would
seem reasonable to suggest that Australia is not particularly hospitable
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towards some disease agents - perhaps including FMD."
At the PWC Hearing Dr Snowdon spoke of low susceptibility of
Australian native animals to FMD and continued, "we believe the fauna
would not constitute a grave risk should we have an outbreak of FMD in
Austral i a.
Unfortunately, at the time of writing, documents and reports of the
period 1964-1972, although applied for, were not available and their
contents had to be gleaned from later reports and histories.

However

this in itself is significant and Conrad makes the point that "basic
decisions regarding technologies are rarely put at the disposal of the
general public and scientific evaluations of projects generally only
have a legitimating character.
The need for ANAHL was firmly established by 1970 and one can only
speculate on the arguments put forward, since "the way a decision is
arrived at and the way it is rationally accounted for post hoc on a
consistent basis are not the same."^^
By the time the PET was formed in August 1970, its terms of
reference were to determine feasibility, not need.

Conrad again makes

the point that "technology assessments or environmental assessments tend
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to enter once the major policy options have been established".
Furthermore, these policy options have been established by members of
committed institutions which "gradually come to define social goals in

terms of 'needs' for major public investments in a particular form of
technology.

And their perception of need - their definition of social

values - naturally reflects their commitments, since that is their
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raison d'etre."
Once the proposal had reached the stage of a PWC Inquiry it had
been extensively examined and gained Government support.

The need for

the facility seemed by then to be assumed self-evident and rigorous
arguments of need were not put forward.

Wynne emphasises the point that

the debates surrounding the assessment of technology focus on questions
of risks and costs and skim over benefits and needs.

This he claims is

because risks and costs can be "phrased in more factual terms"54 whereas
need and benefit reflect social values more directly.
In the case of ANAHL, although "factual" information on the
economic importance of the livestock industry and the increasing number
of travellers was presented, it was not made explicit that the
interpretation of this information and its perception as a risk, and in
particular the degree of risk involved, was value laden.

Although the

uncertainty in the assessment of risk was indicated by Mr Gee's evidence
which conflicted with the arguments of the CSIRO, this conclusion was
avoided by the PWC and the need for ANAHL was taken as proved.
The objective of Dr Eichhorn's visit was to investigate Australia's
preparedness to cope with an exotic disease outbreak.

As well as con-

taining an implicit assumption that an outbreak was likely, this
objective is stated imprecisely.

Collingridge points out that if an

objective is stated imprecisely it is often difficult to criticise
decisions and show that they may not be the most effective way of
meeting those objectives.^^

Wynne states that a characteristic of most

technology assessment is that usually only a single technology is
evaluated and the question of relative benefits, "a more overtly
political question" is avoided.^^

Questions of how else this objective

could be achieved were not addressed and all investigations

ubsequent

to Dr Eichhorn's visit concentrated on assessing the need for a maximum
security animal health laboratory and not on how Australia could best
prepare and protect itself.
In a CSIRO News Release, Dr Wild, Chairman of the CSIRO, stated:
"CSIRO, like ASTEC, the National Farmers' Federation and worldwide
expert opinion, believes that ANAHL is needed now as before to diagnose
and combat exotic animal diseases.

It is noteworthy that Canada is now

to build a high security laboratory modelled on ANAHL ... The $150
million capital investment is a small price to pay to help protect
Australia's $1500 million per year export meat industry."^^
After twenty years the same argument is being used:
to protect our livestock industries.

we need ANAHL
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CHAPTER THREE
THE COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS

THE COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS
An important component in the arguments justifying the need for
ANAHL and its economic viability was the cost benefit analysis
undertaken by the Bureau of Agricultural Economics in June 1974 at the
request of Dr Kesteven (Consultant, Department of Agriculture) and
presented to the PWC Hearing.
The question of economic viability had not been addressed pr;ior
to this study.

When the proposal to establish a national animal health

laboratory went to the Government in October 1972 not even a formal cost
was stated. ^

At the PWC Hearing neither the CSIRO nor Department of

Health included a statement of the cost of the facility.

Mr Kelly (PWC

Member) remarked "This is the first time I have seen such a submissipn
without any mention of the question of the cost of it.
certain coyness in the evidence.

There is a

No one mentions such a mundane matter

as money, but one of the things you must do when you have to evaluate
the need for it is put it alongside the cost of it.

What is also

notable is that there has been no discussion about the operating costs of
it."^

Mr Kelly also noted: "It is unusual that it should go to Cabinet

without a price tag on it."^
Although submissions to the PWC Hearing contained general
suggestions of the benefits that would result from the establishment of
ANAHL the BAE study attempted to identify and quantify these benefits.
On the basis of this study alone the PWC concluded that the proposal to
build ANAHL was economically justified.

In its Report the PWC stated:

" In an examination of the economic aspects of the
Animal Health Laboratory proposal, the Bureau of
Agricultural Economics concluded that it could be a
viable proposition as a result of the expected
benefits arising from research programs alone and if
these benefits were combined with a disease outbreak
situation, there seems to be little doubt regarding
the economic viability of the p r o p o s a l .
Since subsequent reports and discussions apparently assumed the
economic viability of ANAHL on the basis of the PWC investigation it is
important not only to examine the BAE Report itself but to investigate
the PWC's assessment of it.
The objective of cost benefit analysis is to determine whether the
benefits derived from a project outweigh the costs incurred.

In order

to achieve this objective, the costs and benefits have first to be
identified, and then ascribed a monetary value.

One criticism of cost
»

benefit analysis is that not all the costs and benefits can be or are
identified, nor can they always be quantified.

As well as the direct

costs and benefits, a number of other factors have an impact on the
analysis;

these include the time period adopted, the discount rate

selected, the decision criteria, external costs and social costs as well
as a number of background assumptions, both stated and unstated.

All

these factors require a judgment to be made, often on little or no
evidence, but once they have been expressed numerically and then
manipulated according to formal rul
es they tend to be assigned an
objectivity and certainty. ^
The approach taken by the BAE was to attempt to calculate the
magnitude of the benefits needed to equal the estimated costs of
building and running ANAHL and it was assumed that tangible benefits
would result and that these benefits could be measured in monetary

terms.
The report admitted the analysis was extremely approximate:

"There

is a large degree of uncertainty associated with the type of benefits,
their possible magnitude and time of occurrence.
available on any of these aspects."

Virtually no data were

However three sources of benefits

were identified on the basis of "various descriptions of the objectives
and functions" ^ of ANAHL and were listed in the summary and conclusions
as:
a)

*
the prevention of substantial losses in export revenues earned from
livestock product sales;

b)

the reduction in production losses and livestock slaughterings that
might be considered necessary without an ANAHL; and

c)

the benefits which might be expected to be derived from programs of

g

research at the laboratory.
In order to give an estimate of these benefits in monetary terms
the following twelve assumptions were adopted by the BAE:
1.
Outbreaks of foot and mouth disease (FMD) only
were taken into account.
2.

Capital costs of the NAHL: $56 million allocated over the construction period.

3.

Construction period of the NAHL: Ten years.

4.

Effective productive capacity of the NAHL: Zero
from years 0 to 10 positive from years 11 to
50. Although the potential for benefits to be
generated in years 7 to 10, when the Laboratory
is nearing completion, is recognised, the
provision of insufficient data precludes their
estimation.

5.

Effective life of the Laboratory: 40 years
(i.e., years 11 to 50).*

6.

Annual operating costs of the Laboratory:
Beginning in year 7 and growing to $2.8 million

per annum in the years 11 to 50 under a
quiescent disease situation. Outbreak control
costs were unknown but it was assumed that in
years of disease outbreak the $2.85 million
would probably increase substantially but no
assumption as to the magnitude of the possible
increase was made. From preliminary results
obtained it was considered unnecessary that
such an estimate was required.
7.

Discount rate: 8 per cent.

8.

Value of livestock and livestock products:
Based on 1972-73 levels and prices which were
assumed to continue in the future. Hence the
relationship between the estimates of costs
above and the prices received was assumed to
remain constant over time.
Production** - All livestock, $3,384
million per annum; sheep and cattle,
$3,113 million per annum.
Exports - Beef, wool, mutton and
lamb - about $2,000 million per annum.

9.

Sheep population:
$10 per head.

140 million head, valued at

10.

Cattle population:
$100 per head.

28 million head, valued at

11.

Beef exported to the USA and Japan: approximately 400,000 tonnes or 68 per cent of total
beef exports.

12.

Main sources of benefits due to the operation
of the NAHL:
Reduction in losses on export markets,
domestic livestock production and stock
slaughtered for disease control.
Benefits from training, research and
technological advances at the Laboratory.

*

Because of the discounting procedures used the
addition to the present value of benefits for
those received beyond year 50 has only a very
minor effect.

**

BAE 'Trends in Australian Rural Production and
Exports' No.69 March 21974. As at 31 March
1974 total sheep numbers were 148 million and
total cattle (beef and dairy) were 31.1 million.

These assumptions can be divided into two types.

The first type

included estimates of the number of livestock and the value of
livestock and livestock products along with estimates of the cost of
ANAHL and the time of construction, and these could be described as scale
assumptions.

While there is room for debate over the precise value

assigned to these assumptions, the validity of the item itself is not in
dispute, i.e., a variety of figures could be given for the value^of
livestock for example, but no one would argue that the value of
livestock was not an important consideration in the analysis.

The

selection of the rate of discount is also a scale assumption, and the
value assigned can have a significant effect on the cost benefit ratio,
resulting in the possibility that benefits are overstated and costs
understated or vice versa.
The second type of assumption is more problematic.

This group

involves assumptions about events that may occur, about the period of
time over which the laboratory will be active and about the benefits
resulting from ANAHL, and these could be described as substantive
assumptions.

For example, the basis for the selection of forty years as

the effective life of the laboratory was given by Mr Miller (Acting
Director, BAE) in answer to a question posed by Mr McVeigh:
Mr McVeigh:

"You have just taken this as a period of forty years for
the purpose of your exercise, not that because some
expert from another department said that this is going to
last forty or fifty years?

Mr Miller:

You have just taken this?"

"That is Correct." ^^

The assumption made regarding the annual operating costs contains

both scale and substantive assumptions.

The cost under a quiescent disease

situation is an assumption of scale and was estimated at $2.8 million
per annum.

The cost of operation in an outbreak situation would involve

substantive assumptions but although the BAE recognised that these costs
would "increase substantially" during an outbreak "no assumption as to
the magnitude of the possible increase was made".^^

This means that the

potential benefits were calculated on the basis of an outbreak of FMD
but the BAE "considered it unnecessary" ^^ to estimate the true fcosts to
ANAHL of handling a FMD outbreak.
Each of the three identified sources of benefits was considered
separately, and using the eleven assumptions an "attempt [was made] to
demonstrate the feasibility of obtaining the magnitude of benefits
during the period from year 11 to 50 which would at least equal themagnitude of cost of the NAHL."14
The first benefit considered was the prevention of substantial
losses in export sales.

According to the discounting assumptions, it

was calculated that if an outbreak of FMD occurred in year 11, $120
million of export revenue would have to be saved.

If the outbreak

occurred in year 46, the complete export revenue of about $2,000 million
would need to be saved.

In that case ANAHL would not only have to

"reduce export losses" but prevent them altogether, an assumption that
is not made explicit anywhere in the report and indeed one which is
contrary to any evidence presented in any of the submissions.

In the

CSIRO submission, Dr Pierce stated that ANAHL "cannot keep exotic
diseases out of Australia;

that is not its purpose." ^^

It is also

interesting that year 46 was chosen in this example, whereas year 50 was
used in the other examples.

If year 50 had been used the benefits would

need to be $2582 million, that is more than the entire export revenue.
This argument clearly shows that estimation of benefits and costs over
50 years was unjustified.
An alternative calculation in this example shows that if ANAHL
prevented losses of $10 million each year from years 11 to 50 this would
equal the investment in the laboratory.
All these calculations appear to underestimate seriously the costs
of an outbreak of FMD (Assumption 1 stated that only FMD outbreaks are
taken into account.) From evidence given at the PWC^^

it was understood

that an outbreak of FMD in Australia would result in the immediate
closure of the export market.

Çven if some countries continued to trade

it is certain that Japan and USA would not, and since these two countries
accounted for two thirds of Australia's beef exports,^^ this would
represent a loss in exports of over $1300 million per annum.

These bans

would remain in force for 6-12 months after eradication.
In the Summary and Conclusions, the BAE stated that these examples
"provide a clear indication of the order of magnitude of benefits which
might be expected in the event of an exotic disease outbreak occurring."
However this appears to be a deliberate inversion of the argument.

As

noted previously the calculations are based on the magnitude of benefits
which would be required to equal the costs of ANAHL with no discussion
or indication of the feasibility of achieving this result.
The second example used by the BAE looked at the benefits from a
reduction in production and slaughter losses that might be considered
necessary without an ANAHL.

Again the calculations were undertaken to

indicate the order of magnitude of the benefits, in this case the

reduced slaughter and production losses, required to equal the costs of
ANAHL.

And again the conclusion formed was that these required benefits

were in fact benefits that might be expected from the operation of ANAHL
without any examination of the ways in which this might be achieved.
As well as assuming that ANAHL would have an effect on slaughter
and production losses, a number of assumptions not included in their
list of 11 basic assumptions were made.

It was assumed that "the sale of

all livestock and livestock products would be prohibited from the
affected areas" and that "a proportion of livestock in the affected
areas would be slaughtered as a disease control measure." ^^

However they

did not take into account the effect of reduced sales of livestock
products following the control of a disease outbreak, despite recognising
that an outbreak would have an impact on this for several years aftfer
control was established.

This means that all the costs were not taken

into account.
In order to achieve the required magnitude of benefit it was
assumed that 0.6% of Australia's livestock was affected by an exotic
disease outbreak each year and that the presence of ANAHL

would reduce

the effects of the disease to a nine month period each year and that it
would save half the value of stock slaughtered.

However, the CSIRO

evidence claimed that in the event of an outbreak all stock in the area
20
would be slaughtered "whether showing signs of infection or not".

There

appears to be no reasonable basis for the assumption that ANAHL could
reduce the time period of the disease from twelve months to nine months
and the basis for assuming 0.6% disease rate seems to be that it gives
the correct answer.

"It was discovered that if 0.6% of Australia's

sheep and cattle population is affected by an exotic disease outbreak

each year, the annual benefits from savings in production and disease
control slaughterings combined are $10.97 million, which exceed the
annuity required for the NAHL project to break even."^^
As with the first example, these calculations underestimate the
impact and costs of an FMD outbreak.

The CSIRO pointed out that an

outbreak would involve a total ban on exports^^ therefore production and
slaughter losses within the affected area cannot be considered iin
isolation from the economic costs incurred overall.
The third example considered the benefits resulting from research
at ANAHL.

Although the BAE admitted that "estimates of the monetary

returns which might be expected from research programs are subject to a
very large degree of uncertainty" they were able to give the following
"simple examples":
"Assume a research breakthrough occurred in year 11.
If the value of that technological advance added $10
million or 0.29 per cent to the gross value of $3,384
million of livestock production in that year, and no
further increase was achieved through the research
efforts of the NAHL staff, the project would break
even in economic terms, i.e., from years 11 to 50 the
annual gross value of livestock production in 1972-73
prices would be $3,394 million.
Alternatively a contribution from research at the
NAHL to the annual gross value of livestock
production ($3,384 million) equivalent in value to a
compound rate of gain of 0.007 per cent per year from
year 11 to 50 would be required for the project to
break even.
Even if it is assumed that a 10 year
period elapses between a research discovery and
adoption of the practice, the necessary compound rate
of gain in value terms for the project to break even
rises from 0.007 per cent over 40 years to 0.02 per
cent from year 21 to 50."^^
From these examples, and apparently despite the uncertainty
surrounding research, the BAE was able to conclude that ANAHL "could be a

viable proposition as a result of the expected benefits arising from
research programs alone." ^^
No attempt was made to determine the likelihood of a research
breakthrough which would add $10 million to the value of livestock
production.
at all.

Indeed there was no attempt to address the particular area

Rather this is an abstract calculation which could be used to

justify the value of a $50 million investment in research in any field.
«

The returns on research were apparently considered so self-evident that
they needed no justification.

Indeed one might wonder why the logic of

the argument was not turned on its head and a case made that the
increase in the value of production might well be $20 million, so the
Government should invest $100 million of public money in ANAHL!
Although the BAE maintained that ANAHL could be viable on the basis
of research alone, it added that "if these benefits were combined with a
disease outbreak situation there seems to be little doubt about the
economic viability of the ANAHL proposal." ^^ This could be taken as
suggesting that the ANAHL might not be viable on the basis of prevention
of substantial losses in export revenue, production and slaughtering
alone, a suggestion that would seem to run counter to the CSIRO's
economic justification of ANAHL.
The strength of the conclusion that ANAHL could be viable on the
basis of research would appear inconsistent with the BAE's admission of
the very high degree of uncertainty surrounding the benefits of
research.

Furthermore the nature of the research is not discussed.

If

the research is concerned with exotic diseases it is difficult to
understand how economic advantages can be derived from it, when the
disease is not present in Australia.

In fact if breakthroughs are made

in the control an eradication of FMD and other countries make use of
this, Australia's export market could be disadvantaged since its present
advantage is dependent on its FMD-free status.

If on the other hand, the

research gains are through work on endemic diseases, an interpretation
made by the Australian National Cattlemen's Council, the possibility
that these advances could be made in laboratories, other than ANAHL, has
been overlooked.

'

The BAE stated in its Summary and Conclusions "if the main
assumptions in this paper are regarded as reasonable, this would imply
that the benefits as estimated separately are also reasonable.
However the basic assumptions and methods of calculation were not
questioned by the PWC and in fact there were few questions at all.
Garrick stated: "I have no question, Mr Chairman.

Mr

I think this sub-

mission asserts that it is a necessary organisation and economically
v i a b l e . M r Keogh said: "If somebody such as Mr Miller (Acting
Director, BAE) and others are convinced of the economic viability of it,
with the CSIRO running it, we are not in disagreement with the
28

question."

Once again it is the standing and reputation of

individuals, rather than the strength of arguments and evidence, which
became the final basis for decision-making.
It would seem that when the data are too technical or complex,
requiring special expertise or at least detailed critical analysis, the
attention of those assessing the evidence is drawn to the conclusions
only, and the credibility or legitimacy of the organisation providing
the evidence is assessed instead.
As Wynne says: "Expertise and authority can be negotiated by ...

pretending that decisions are based on sophisticated technical
forecasting and similar calculations, as opposed to structurally 'given'
presumptions and g u e s s w o r k . T h i s image of expertise serves to legitimate
political decisions.
The power of numbers and scientific method plus the authority of
the BAE was enough to convince the PWC of the validity on the conclusions in the study.

However during the questioning period the
*

extremely weak basis of the calculations was admitted.
stated:

Mr Miller

"The data simply does not exist for the type of analysis that

would need to be done before one could say professionally that this
laboratory is definitely an economic proposition.

What we have done is

to, if you like, do some scribbling on the back of a used envelope,
pulled some figures out of a hat an tried to provide the interdepartmental committee and this Committee with some figures which will
help to form a judgment as to whether an insurance policy of this type
is likely to be b e n e f i c i a l . " N o t only does this statement appear to
have been overlooked in assessing the evidence but it does not appear to
be consistent with the authoritative and scientific tone of the BAE
Report.
The BAE Report provides a classic illustration of many of the
problems associated with cost-benefit analysis.

All the costs and

benefits cannot be known, included or measured.

The BAE recognised that

their economic framework "ignores any consideration of the impacts of
environmental and social welfare" ^^and that "often these aspects may
not be possible to quantify, but nevertheless have an important bearing
on a decision to invest in a particular p r o j e c t . I n

fact it could be

argued that it is impossible to ascribe values to costs and benefits at

all, since it is in the realm of conjecture rather than an objective
scientific exercise.
The use of cost-benefit analysis in technology assessment is a
political act and as Johnston says "produces a spurious mathematical
precision for very imprecisely known relationships and uses the power of
numbers to give an appearance of authenticity to decisions."^^
In a discussion on the economic analytical frcaaework used, tlie BAE
claimed that "ideally the economic criteria [of estimated costs,
estimated benefits and the time period over which the costs and benefits
are expected to be incurred and received] should be used to compare a
number-of projects in order to select those with the greatest expected
net benefits and to determine how a limited supply of capital should'be
allocated to the projects in the most economically efficient way."^"^
Since there were no other alternatives presented for controlling
outbreaks of exotic disease in Australia, the analysis compared the
"magnitude of estimated livestock product losses without a NAHL with the
possible saving of a proportion of those losses if the NAHL was built."^^
This is consistent with Wynne's observation that an
important characteristic of most technology assessment is that usually
only a single technology is evaluated and the question of relative
36
benefits, "a more overtly political question", is avoided.
Indeed, it would not be difficult to argue that the cost-benefit
analysis was framed and conducted with only one possible outcome in mind
- the provision of a particular kind of authoritative support for the
construction of ANAHL.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE PROPOSED FUNCTIONS OF ANAHL

THE PROPOSED FUNCTIONS OF ANAHL
Introduction
The proposed functions of ANAHL reconinended by Dr Eichhorn after
his investigation in 1964 were, diagnosis and vaccine testing and
production.

However by 1970, the Commonwealth-States Veterinary

Committee (CSVC) Working Party, whose terms of reference included an
investigation of the need for, and the appropriate functions of, i
maximum security animal health laboratory, had considerably extended and
elaborated the functions recorranended by Dr Eichhorn.

The CSVC

recommendations which were presented to the Australian Agricultural
Council (AAC) in 1970, proposed the functions of initial diagnosis,
continuing diagnosis during an outbreak, and monitoring of strains ofvirus isolated during an outbreak, definitively establishing freedom from
disease, and training.
The reconmiendations of the Inter-Departmental Committee, set up by
the Minister for Health, which were also presented to the AAC in 1970,
included the functions of diagnosis, training, testing material from
quarantine stations and performing research on indigenous Australian
animal virus diseases.

So the IDC did not specify vaccine manufacture

and testing, but did include two new functions for ANAHL, namely
quarantine testing and research on endemic disease.
Following the proposals from the CSVC an IDC, the AAC formed a
Panel, comprising senior representatives of the States under the
Chairmanship of the Secretary of the Department of Primary Industry.
This Panel combined and detailed the functions recommended by the CSVC
and IDC and listed them as:

i. Establish techniques for the rapid diagnosis of exotic or foreign
virus diseases;
ii. Conduct research on indigenous virus infections of animals and
assist in their control;
iii. Train field staff in the recognition and presumptive diagnosis of
virus diseases, and laboratory staff in techniques for the
isolation and identification of viruses; and

.

iv. Provide highly trained virologists and maximum security laboratory
and animal accommodation which would be required if an exotic
disease were introduced into Australia.

The provision of such

staff and facilities would make it possible to:
a)

determine, where it was suspected that a new animal disease
had reached Australia, whether there was an outbreak of an
exotic disease or an outbreak of a disease already present;

b)

provide laboratory support for disease control work in the
field, particularly monitoring the spread of an exotic disease
and finally establishing freedom from the disease;

c)

provide facilities for the safety and potency testing of any
vaccine prepared against an exotic disease;

d)

train field and laboratory staff in the recognition and
methods of control of particular diseases;

e)

test materials collected from animals imported into a high
security quarantine station for the presence of exotic disease
agents;

V.

and

provide a vaccine production unit capable of producing 200,000
doses of FMD vaccine per month.^

The Chairman of the AAC Panel then invited the Chairman of the
CSIRO to carry out a feasibility study.

A Proposal Evaluation Team

(PET) was established and its report published in 1972 concluded that it
was feasible to construct a high security laboratory in Australia and
that the proposed functions were appropriate.
At the Parliamentary Public Works Committee Hearing in September
1974, Dr Snowdon, then Senior Principal Research Scientist, Division of
Animal Health CSIRO, in his evidence listed the following proposed!
functions for ANAHL:
"a.

To provide a diagnostic service to support the control and eradication of exotic diseases of livestock should they be introduced
into Australia and to ensure that livestock imported into an
offshore quarantine station are free of exotic disease;

b.

To undertake research into indigenous and exotic diseases of
livestock;

c.

To train laboratory and field personnel in the diagnosis and
control of exotic diseases; and

d.

To provide facilities for producing 200,000 doses of FMD vaccine
2
per month.

These functions were adopted in full by the PWC and have provided a
reference point for subsequent reports and discussions.
It would appear that following Dr Eichhorn's original recommendations, attempts were made to justify the need for ANAHL in broader
terms than simply those of coping with an exotic disease emergency.

The

additional functions of research, training and quarantine testing
provided ANAHL with continuous functions, which added weight to the
arguments of the need for ANAHL by demonstrating that the facility could

be usefully employed outside a disease outbreak situation, as well as
overcoming the potential criticism that ANAHL was unnecessary because
Australia would never experience an outbreak of serious exotic disease.
Quarantine testing and research also provided economic arguments aimed
at convincing primary producers that ANAHL would enable them to improve
their stock through wider importation and that important work would be
done on diseases which were currently a problem.

^

At the PWC Hearing, Dr Kesteven, then consultant to the Department
of Agriculture, related the need for ANAHL to the functions of the
proposed Bureau of Animal Health. The functions of the new BAH were to
be:
"1.

A national uniform disease recording and trace-back system.

2.

Planning and coordination of animal disease control programmes.

3.

Epidemiology studies relating to necessary field of research.

4.

Determining priorities and planning disease control.

5.

Overseas reporting on animal diseases in Australia."^
ANAHL would provide, according to Dr Kesteven, part of the

"essential back-up" but this is not obvious from the listed functions of
the BAH, and a specific role for ANAHL was not mentioned in the
submission which would line up with the proposed functions."^
Reports and publications from 1974-1982 referred to the functions
of ANAHL as those "approved as being appropriate"^ by the PWC but in
September 1982 the BAH produced a report ANAHL and Exotic Disease
Control which made no reference to the PWC functions.

Instead it

stated that: "The three broad functions of ANAHL are to:
Increase Australia's preparedness to diagnose, control and

eradicate outbreaks of exotic animal diseases.
Facilitate the safe importation of livestock.
Facilitate the export of livestock and livestock products."
So the BAH had gone back to a more generalised statement of
function using the terms "diagnose, control and eradicate" to encompass
controversial areas such as training, vaccine production and testing and
research, but again adding another economic incentive to primary
i

producers by emphasising the quarantine aspect.
The controversy over live virus importation eventually led to the
ASTEC Inquiry (1962) which re-examined all aspects of ANAHL.

In their

Summary and Recommendations they stated:
"The main role of the Laboratory should be to provide
a secure Australian capability for primary diagnosis
of exotic diseases of animals and for monitoring of
any outbreak. In association with this function,
ANAHL should also undertake appropriate research into
exotic pathogens, with the overall objective of
increasing Australia's ability for their prompt
detection, identification and eradication. The role
of the Laboratory in offering veterinary training,
and in the production and testing of vaccines is less
clear-cut, and will depend upon the requirements for
particular di seases."7
Evidently, during the eighteen years from 1964-1982 there have been
various additions,
of ANAHL.
closely.

elaborations and shifts of emphasis in the functions

In the following section these changes will be examined more

THE DIAGNOSTIC FUNCTION

From the time of the initial proposal, in 1964, to the establishment of a maximum security animal disease laboratory, diagnosis has
always been considered the main function.

The 1982 CSIRO Ferguson

Report stated: "There is no doubt that diagnosis is the prime function of
ANAHL and cannot be dispensed with." ®

.

Because ANAHL has been characterised as a diagnostic facility, many
of the arguments justifying the function of diagnosis coincide with
those justifying the need for ANAHL itself.
As discussed in Chapter Two, an increasing emphasis was placed on
the inevitability of exotic diseases entering Australia.

Added to this

were the arguments of the positive benefits to come to primary producers
from the establishment of ANAHL.

These arguments, together with a

statement of the economic importance of the livestock industry to
Australia, provided the basis for establishing a need for a maximum
security diagnostic facility in Australia.
Primary producer organisations argued that the size of the livestock industry justified Australia becoming self-reliant in diagnosing
exotic diseases:

"It is to be deplored that Australia - a country that

relies so much on livestock production - must use other countries'
facilities for testing possible major threats to its valuable primary
industry."^
nationalism

The basis for this argument is little more than one of
- that we are a big country so we should have our own

facility and not be forced to rely on foreigners.
As well as these general- arguments, specific arguments which

focused on the unsatisfactory nature and limitations of the current
arrangements were put forward to promote the need for ANAHL to perform a
diagnostic function.

At the PWC Hearing it was maintained that overseas

laboratories may be unreliable, their use could result in costly delays
or inaccuracies and they could not perform the necessary follow-up
testing.
In the Department of Health submission to the PWC Hearing, Mr Gee
suggested the tenuous nature of these arrangements, but the distinction
between an initial diagnosis and follow-up testing after an outbreak had
been confirmed, was blurred.

Mr Gee stated: "Arrangements have been

made with a number of reference laboratories both in Australia and
overseas for the acceptance of si)ecimens from cases of suspected exotic
disease in this country.

These arrangements are in the nature of a '

gentleman's agreement between the Directors and the Quarantine Division
of the Australian Department of Health.

In no sense is there any

contractual agreement by which any overseas laboratory is committed to
accepting specimens on a continuing basis from this country."
Although the word "continuing" is included, the overall sense seems
to suggest that these overseas laboratories are unreliable even for
initial diagnosis.

Apparently this was the interpretation Senator

Melzer (PWC member) placed on it when he asked, "On the face of it, with
these gentlemen's agreements we could finish up with all those doors
closed in our face?"

Mr Gee:

"Yes." ^^

However, during questioning, Dr Pierce of the CSIRO stated, "they
(Pirbright) are a world reference centre ... their responsibility is to
establish a diagnosis." ^^

In an article in Rural Research, the CSIRO

stated, "reference laboratories, whether or not funded by the Food and
Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations are only committed to a
primary diagnosis." ^^
Mr Gee, in his evidence, went on to state:

"Contact with some of

these laboratories is infrequent and there is always the possibility
that cooperation may be affected by changing

circumstances of, e.g.,

politics, war or communications."^"^
To substantiate his claim that overseas laboratories may be^
unreliable, Mr Gee pointed out that in a routine reconfirmation of
cooperation only six of the ten cooperating laboratories replied.
Although a list of the laboratories concerned was contained in Appendix
B it was not made explicit in the submission itself, that, included in
the four who did not reply were Plum Island and the Wellcome Research
Laboratory, England.

During questioning Mr Gee admitted that "We ...

have a very close contact with the United States in Plum Island" and
that

"fortunately we have received confirmatory replies from the most

important ones." ^^
The two other laboratories which did not reply were The Veterinary
and Research Laboratory Dokki, United Arab Republic, a world reference
centre for Sheep Pox, and the Central Veterinary Institute, Budapest,
Hungary, a world reference centre for Dourine.

Perhaps the Department

of Health's fears of disruption due to politics or war were justified in
these cases, but it is important to note that neither of these diseases
is ranked as a high priority danger to Australia. ^^
At the ANAHL Forum, Dr Brown (Deputy Director Pirbright) was asked
if there was "any possibility of a situation, maybe due to a government
of a different persuasion or to a change of policy by the management of

Pirbright, which may result in the delay of testing or the refusal to
handle material from Australia for the pur|K)se of identifying a suspected outbreak."

Dr Brown answered:

"I think ... that it (Pirbright) has

been the most philanthropic organisation in the scientific world over
the last twenty-five years in the field of virus diagnosis.
tries to help anybody who seeks help.

Pirbright

When the Australian authorities

sought help in 1979 they got a lot."^^
Dr Snowdon, in the CSIRO Submission, also pointed out the
shortcomings of relying on overseas laboratories:

"The procedures

required to obtain diagnoses in overseas laboratories are accompanied by
uncertainties and delays.

For instance, material may be lost in

transit, or exposed to conditions which could destroy disease agents
which it may contain, and unless Australian authorities are in constant
contact with the overseas laboratories that have agreed to carry out the
diagnostic tests, there can be misunderstandings resulting in failure to
obtain a diagnosis."^®
However during cross-examination Dr Snowdon replied that Pirbright
would give a diagnosis, "possibly within two or three to four hours" of
receipt of the sample although, "if they have to grow it up in tissue
culture, which is the second procedure, I would say that would take 48
hours, but possibly 24 if everything works well."^^
This time-frame was confirmed by the events at Humpty Doo, Northern
Territory, where on Friday 26 May 1983, two pigs were suspected of
having a vesicular disease.

These animals were examined by a Northern

Territory pathologist on Saturday 27 May and were subsequently killed
and autopsied.

Tissue samples were then sent to Pirbright and these

arrived Sunday 29 May and testing commenced immediately.

By Monday 30

May, the Mi nister for Primary Industry, John Kerin, was able to announce
that preliminary tests were negative and that a final clearance should
be available within two to three days.^^
Other reasons were also given for avoiding reliance on overseas
laboratories.

Dr Snowdon argued:

"No overseas laboratory could be

expected to undertake the large number of tests required during the
control and eradication of an exotic disease.

*

This claim was also made by Dr Pierce in his evidence:

"Overseas

laboratories could not be expected to carry out tests on anything like
the scale that may be required" and, he continued:

"Moreover, the need to

send material continually overseas, for diagnosis would severely limit
the speed and effectiveness of the many decisions that would have to be
made during the course of an eradication campaign.
The matter of whether overseas laboratories would be prepared to
carry out follow-up testing was questioned by Mr Kelly of the PWC.

Dr

Pierce replied, "whether the negotiations have been carried out, whether
the questions have been asked as to how many tests they would be
prepared to carry out, I would rather you questioned the Department of
Health on that.

All I know is that we requested that they confirm an

initial tentative diagnosis."^"^
When the hearing resumed the following day Dr Pierce offered the
following additional information:
"I spoke to the Director (of Pirbright), Dr John
Brooksby, by telephone last night and he said simply,
no. They have not got available facilities for
carrying out expensive testing for overseas
countries, nor did they consider this their responsibility. The Director could not make nor could he
hold such facilities for immediate readiness for such

an emergency. I asked him whether he would do so if
Australia were prepared to pay for the service. He
again said. No. He pointed out that samples submitted for the initial confirmatory diagnosis, which is
their responsibility of course, have to be accompanied by very detailed documentation. This was the
arrangement under which they agreed to carry out this
service and to accept the samples. He considered
that it would be unreasonable to demand and impractical to provide such documentation for a larger
number of samples which would be required for testing
in order to monitor a control and eradication
program. His further advice was that such a procedure, using a laboratory that is 12,000 miles away
from the outbreak, was not a practical approach to
the backing required by those carrying out the control and eradication program in the field. There
would inevitably be delays which he felt would be
unacceptable."25

*

The next stage of the argument presented to the PWC combined the
limitation of overseas laboratories with,economic considerations.

Dr

Pierce stated:
"As mentioned previously, much of our overseas
trade in meat and livestock products would cease
overnight if Australia had an outbreak of FMD. In the
absence of any other evidence, those nations constituting our major overseas market for meat would
normally require that Australia remain free of FMD
for some time after a declaration of successful
eradication and before allowing a resumption of meat
imports. On the other hand, if Australia had diagnostic facilities, these countries might be expected
to reduce this period considerably as the result of
the provision of laboratory diagnostic tests showing
negative results. A reduction in lost trading time
of even a few months could represent a gain of
million of dollars from agricultural exports." ^^
This argument represented a considerable jump in reasoning and no
evidence was given to substantiate the claim that ANAHL could reduce the
time period of export bans.

However its effectiveness was evident from

this statement in the Australian National Cattlemen's Council
submission:

"The presence of the ANAHL would mean that in the event of

an outbreak of exotic disease, an eradication program would commence

more rapidly than if no such laboratory was available, and it was
necessary to rely on overseas facilities.

Each month's delay in having

Australia declared free after such an outbreak, is worth approximately
$5.5 million in beef exports alone."
Yet in the CSIRO submission, Dr Pierce stated: "... measures to
contain the spread of the disease would be taken at the site of a
suggested outbreak before a positive diagnosis was obtained,"^®and, in a
i

later section headed "Eradication Procedures for FMD", he stated that in
the event of an outbreak of FMD there would be, "total and immediate
eradication by the slaughter of all infected and in contact stock whether
showing signs of infection or not."29

This would indicate that

eradication would be undertaken immediately, on the basis of clinical
symptoms alone without waiting for laboratory confirmation, therefore
there would be no advantage in respect of the time period involved, from
the presence of ANAHL.

Similarly, there appears no basis for the CSIRO

argument that ANAHL would reduce the time of a trading ban.

Trading

partners would most likely require independent confirmation of freedom
from disease and the time delay involved in having confirmation from
Pirbright could be measured in hours or days and not months as suggested
by the CSIRO.
The same arguments that were used at the PWC Hearing in 1974 to
demonstrate the disadvantages of relying on overseas laboratories were
used by the Australian Bureau of Animal Health in 1982:
be delayed, rendered useless or lost in transit.

"Specimens may

Further delays may

occur after the samples reach the laboratory if it is hard-pressed and
cannot allot them priority ... Laboratories may become unsuitable for

political reasons or because they lose key staff, or reorder their own
priorities.

We cannot be certain that any laboratory will divert

resources to carry out the necessary follow-up testing beyond the preliminary examination."

And in the conclusion to the BAH Report

(ANAHL and Exotic Disease Control 82) the claim was made that (ANAHL)
"will help to ensure that our vital domestic and export markets are
safeguarded and are disrupted as little as possible." ^^
At the ANAHL Forum Dr Southcott (Assistant Chief, Division o^
Animal Health, CSIRO) maintained that ANAHL, "will follow rather than lead in
making an initial diagnosis and is unlikely to influence the outcome."^^
He also stated that having a high security laboratory would not mean
that the disease would be detected earlier or that the outbreaks would
be smaller and brought under control more rapidly.

As he pointed out,

Britain experienced its largest outbreak of FMD in 1967 despite its
maximum security laboratory at Pirbright, its considerable experience in
FMD eradication campaigns and despite having about five times as many
33

vets as Australia and only about one-fifth of our susceptible livestock.
In its promotional booklet "How would we cope with an outbreak of
FMD", the CSIRO stated that during the 1982 Danish FMD outbreak, the
Danish high-security laboratory "was regarded as a vital resource in the
eradication program" and that it "came up with their primary
diagnosis
34
within eighteen hours of receiving the first specimen."

However it

failed to mention that initially, on the basis of a field diagnosis, the
animals were thought to be suffering from mucosal disease.

This

misdiagnosis resulted in the loss of four-five days before a diagnosis
of FMD was established, and facilitated the spread of the disease to
twenty-two properties before containment.^^

This incident highlighted the importance of accurate field
diagnosis and recognition of symptoms by primary producers themselves.
Mr Gee has continually stressed the importance of early diagnosis.

"The

essence of containment of an introduced exotic disease is early
diagnosis" 36 and "of vital importance in any control and eradication
campaign is the early detection and diagnosis of the exotic disease." ^^
But this argument would seem to point to the need for the training
i

or primary producers and veterinarians in the recognition of exotic
diseases rather than the need for a diagnostic laboratory.

The greatest

potential time loss is likely to be in the initial response of the
farmer and veterinary officer.
The BAH report on the Humpty Doo incident in the Northern
Territory stated that the lesions on the suspect pigs were estimated' to
be approximately one to two weeks old.^®

The difference in time between

sending samples to Geelong or Pirbright is small in comparison to this
one to two week delay in the initial recognition.
So although it has been claimed that ANAHL will reduce the time
taken to obtain a diagnosis, it may in fact reduce minimally only one
part of a chain of events, all filled with uncertainty.
The Australian National Cattlemen's Council submission to the PWC
stated, "The ANAHL is essential if Australia is to be in a position to
eradicate any exotic diseases that may be introduced at any time in the
39
future."

And the Department of Northern Development stated in its

submission to the PWC that "should an exotic disease such as FMD be
introduced into Australia, its successful control and eradication 40could
only be achieved with the support of a laboratory such as ANAHL".
It

should be noted that there were no veterinary scientists in the
Department;

it was admitted during questioning that the Department

relied on scientific advice given by the Department of Health and the
41

CSIRO.

But as Dr Southcott pointed out, Australia had been successful

in the past in eradicating exotic diseases and the last outbreak of FMD
in the US in 1929 was eradicated before the existence of Plum Island
42

Animal Disease Centre.
It would seem that the arguments used to justify ANAHL's diagnostic
function moved from demonstrating the inadequacies of the present
arrangements, to making claims that ANAHL could provide an "insurance
against the day an outbreak of an exotic disease occurs."

From the

evidence given and from the experiences of other countries with
diagnostic facilities, there seems to be little support for this claim.
Although the arguments of the CSIRO and Department of Health were
aimed at demonstrating the need for Australia to undertake its own
diagnostic work, they failed to address the question of whether or not
a maximum-security facility was essential for this work. Dr Gibbs at the
ANAHL Forum raised this question an suggested that,
"it does not take an
44
enormous lab of this sort to do simple diagnosis".
Ferguson Report stated:

But as the CSIRO

"In any case, the capital has been spent and it

is not recoverable."^^
At the end of the CSIRO evidence to the PWC, Mr Kelly (PWC Member)
expressed surprise that they had not "made more of the additional value
of the quarantine station that this laboratory makes possible".

He

explained that "one of the interesting aspects of the quarantine hearing
(Mr Kelly was on the committee which reviewed the proposal for the
Quarantine Station in 1973) was that I thought Dr Gee prepared the

ground for this laboratory particularly competently when he mentioned
that our ability to import stock from the more 'dirty' areas was limited
because we did not have what we called then a maximum security laboratory." ^^
Although the Department of Health submission dealt with ANAHL's
role in testing quarantine animals and this function was included in the
PWC Report as part of the diagnostic function of ANAHL, it was not used
*

as a major argument to promote diagnosis at ANAHL.

Yet by 1982 in the

BAH Report a shift in emphasis had occurred and "the three broad
functions of ANAHL" were listed as
increase Australia's preparedness to diagnose, control and
eradicate outbreaks of exotic animal diseases
facilitate the safe importation of livestock
facilitate the export of livestock and livestock products.^^
There are three possible explanations for this new emphasis on
quarantine testing.

First, although the proposal for the establishment

of a maximum security quarantine station went before the PWC in 1973,
construction did not commence until September 1978 and the facility was
not opened until November 1981.

But even before its opening,

questioning of its need and functions occurred.

In April 1981,

Professor B. Morris stated at the Annual Conference of the Cattle
Council of Australia that the Cocos Island Quarantine Station was
"clearly fifty years too late" and was already obsolete because new
technology meant that genetic material could be introduced as ova and
sperm rather than importing whole animals.

48

The proponents of the quarantine station argued that it could only

reach its full potential of ANAHL undertook diagnostic t e s t i n g . O n the
other hand quarantine testing provided another justification for ANAHL
involving a function outside a disease outbreak situation which would
result in continual work.

So each facility was used to justify the

other.
Secondly, it provided additional economic arguments to primary
producers who were told they would be able to improve the genetic
material of their stock and hence improve their productivity.

*

Thirdly, it could be suggested that the close linking of ANAHL to
the quarantine station might have been part of a political move to
expedite the transfer of quarantine matters from the Department of
Health to the BAH.

In the Department of Agriculture submission to the

PWC, Dr Kesteven stated that the BAH, which was to be established in
December 1974, would be responsible for "all Australian Government
Animal Health Services except Animal Quarantine, which will be considered at a later date."^°

Mr Gee, in his capacity as Director of BAH,

stated in 1975 "By agreement between the two Departments, all veterinary
responsibilities other than direct import quarantine are to be transferred during this year from the Department of Health to the Bureau.
In the 1982 Report of the Northern Australian Development Seminar, Mr
Gee stated "there is an anomaly that responsiblity for animal quarantine
rests with the Minister for Health, instead of the Minister for Primary
Industry ... This anomaly is under review following recommendations made
by Senate Inquiry into the Adequacy of Q u a r a n t i n e . T h i s statement
would suggest that Mr Gee considered that Dr Kesteven's "later date" had
arrived.
Although the ASTEC Report recognised that "a specific objective

proposed for ANAHL is to provide diagnostic services in support of
Australia's animal quarantine station",^^ it did not include this in its
list of recommended functions and in fact made no comment on the appropriateness or desirability of this function.

ASTEC did, however,

recognise that the "main role of the Laboratory should be to provide a
secure Australian capability for primary diagnosis of exotic diseases of
animals and for monitoring of any outbreak.
Although the evidence at the PWC demonstrated a need for Australia
to perform its own follow-up testing after an outbreak had been
confirmed, it did not show a need for ANAHL to undertake the initial
diagnosis.

Denmark, during the 1982 outbreak, sent its first and last

samples to Pirbright for confirmation despite having is own diagnosti-c
facilities.

It has also been suggested that trading partners would

require independent confirmation of eradication from a world reference
55

laboratory before the resumption of trade.
The arguments that the existence of ANAHL will mean that outbreaks
are diagnosed earlier and eradicated faster do not appear to be
supported by the evidence.
The current questioning of the usefulness, viability and safety of
the Cocos Islands quarantine station also brings into question the
proposed diagnostic function of ANAHL in relation to the importing of
livestock. ^^
At the PWC Hearing, Dr Snowdon stated:

"the only alternative to

one Australian laboratory such as proposed for ANAHL, is to provide
separate facilities in each of the States."

However, he dismissed this

on the basis.of cost and duplication of services and no other altern-

ative was put forward.^^

More recently. Professor B. Morris and Dr G.

Laver of the Australian National University, among others, have
suggested that mobile facilities for on-farm diagnosis should be
developed and the Australian Academy of Science is currently studying
this possibility.
The arguments put forward at the PWC Hearing justifying a
diagnostic function can be summarised as follows:
1.

Australia needs a diagnostic facility to perform follow-up testing
after an outbreak has been confirmed.

;

It would appear that the arguments presented substantiated
this claim;

overseas laboratories may not be available to perform

follow-up testing on the scale required and even if they were, it
would not be a convenient or efficient way to conduct an
eradication campaign.

However these arguments do not demonstrate

that ANAHL is the only way, or even the best way, of performing
this task.

It could be argued that once an outbreak has occurred,

the maximum security facilities offered by ANAHL are superfluous.
Also the establishment of a centralised facility imposes certain
constraints and current thinking appears to favour a decentralised
approach using on-site testing facilities.
2.

The argument that overseas laboratories could not be relied upon to
perform follow-up testing was then extended to suggest that overseas
laboratories could not be relied upon to perform initial testing.
This would seem an unwarranted extension from the evidence given.

3.

The suggestion that the presence of ANAHL could "protect"
Australia's livestock industry represents a further extension of
the arguments.

Although the CSIRO made the disclaimer that ANAHL

"cannot keep exotic disease out of Australia",^^ this appeared to be
overlooked often, and "protect" was used to mean "prevent the
consequences of an outbreak".

At other times it was used as meaning

"reduce the impact of an outbreak" but there was no evidence given
to substantiate the claim that laboratory diagnosis would have any
impact on the duration of an outbreak.

The usefulness of this

argument would appear to be in providing an economic incentive,
albeit an erroneous one.
i

4.

The final argument used to promote the function of diagnosis was
again an economic argument.

ANAHL is necessary, it has been

argued, to test livestock imported through the Cocos Island
Quarantine Station;

this would allow primary producers to improve

their stock and their economic viability.

The safety and economic

viability of such a scheme is currently being questioned.
It is interesting to note that this argument has moved away
from the original concept of diagnosis in the event of an outbreak,
to providing a justification for diagnosis on a continuing basis.
Thus the diagnostic function has been given a wider meaning,
with a new emphasis on the quarantine aspect, at a time when the
necessity for a maximum security facility for diagnosis of an
outbreak was being questioned.
It would appear that Australia needs diagnostic facilities to
assist in the management of disease outbreaks in Australia.

However it

has not been demonstrated that ANAHL is the only, or the best way of
achieving this, nor do the economic arguments appear justified.

TRAINING FUNCTION
The training function has been promoted as enhancing the diagnostic
function of the laboratory and as a factor in accelerating the
eradication of the disease.

Yet it could be argued that the extension

of the functions of ANAHL to include training provides additional
justification for the establishment of ANAHL by showing that ANAHL "can
be really usefully functioning at all times and not just when there are
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outbreaks".

As

Dr Pierce said during questioning at the

PWC Hearing, "I

think it is very important for you to understand that this laboratory is
not a white elephant between the times when there are outbreaks." ^^
Dr Eichhorn's Report (1964) only recommended that Australia
establish a maximum-security laboratory for diagnosis and vaccine
production, but the CSVC Report (1970) included training as a function
and the IDC Report (1970) specified training for veterinarians.
Although the Panel formed by the AAC in August 1970 is said to have
combined the recommendations of the CSVC and IDC, they, in fact,
extended and detailed training to include the training of "field staff
in the recognition and presumptive diagnosis of virus diseases and
laboratory staff in techniques for the isolation and identification of
viruses."

C O

Although there was no mention of the training function in the 1973
CSIRO Report ^^the CSIRO submission to the PWC in 1974, following the
AAC Panel definition of training function, stated:
"The facilities provided by the ANAHL and the staff
skilled in virological diagnostic techniques will
enable field staff from State and Australian
Government Departments to be trained in the

recognition and presumptive diagnosis of exotic virus
diseases and their differentiation from endemic virus
diseases. It will also provide training for
laboratory staff in the identification of animal
viruses. Training would also be given regarding some
aspects of the contairmient, control and eradication
of exotic diseases."
So training now included two aspects:

the training in field

diagnosis and methods of control, and the training of laboratory staff
in the recognition of viruses.
The training of laboratory staff has not attracted a lot of *
attention or comment.
laboratory staff.

The ASTEC Report briefly refers to training of

It recognised that

"prompt and accurate diagnosis of a suspected exotic
disease can greatly facilitate control and
eradication. Such diagnosis requires the
availability of trained laboratory staff able to
manipulate the initial samples to best advantage, and
implies prior experience with the diagnostic tests to
be used"o5
but maintained that this experience could be gained "through work in
overseas laboratories".^^

The Report went on to say that the "cost of

sending Australians overseas to gain experience in ... laboratory
manipulation ... is minor compared with the benefits of this course of
„67
action .
A question which might be asked is why, if ANAHL "Will be
constantly populated by the best research scientists that we can attract
on a world basis"^^ and "absolutely first class virologists"^^ will be
working there, it would be necessary to train them in animal virus
identification.
Mr Gee extended the notion of training laboratory staff of ANAHL to
training laboratory staff of State diagnostic laboratories.

He saw this

as "essential in case specimens from animals with exotic diseases are
first submitted to a State laboratory with no intimation that anything
out of the ordinary was s u s p e c t e d . H o w e v e r , all the reports on ANAHL
and exotic disease management stress that in a suspected outbreak all
samples would be sent to ANAHL, and that, in fact, ANAHL would be the only
place in Australia capable of diagnosing FMD;

thus the training of

State laboratory staff may be of dubious relevance.
The arguments used for the justification of the training function
i

of ANAHL tend to concentrate on field training following the line of the
PWC Report that "the essence of successful containment of an outbreak of
exotic disease is early recognition in the field."^^
In an address to the Rural Press Club in Brisbane in August 1983,
Dr Snowdon stated:
"The rapid detection of an exotic disease in the
field is dependent on its early recognition by field
officers ... This does not eliminate, of course, the
need for the stockowner to recognise that a disease
is occurring in the first place. Thus the chances of
early recognition will depend on the alertness and
clinical acumen of these officers, ... One of the
roles of ANAHL is to train field officers in the
y2
early recognition of exotic diseases including FMD."
Although Dr Snowdon acknowledged that stockowners play a part in
the recognition of diseases they are not included in the training
programmes at ANAHL.
The Ferguson Report stated
"The Committee agrees that audiovisual and other
training aids have their place. They are
particularly useful for educating the wider audience,
including farmers, but they are not a complete
substitute for trailing that involves the study of
diseased animals."
So it would appear that the CSIRO viewed the diagnostic role of the

veterinary officer as being of greater importance and requiring more
extensive training than the role of the farmer in alerting them to the
disease.
A contrary view was expressed by Dr Gibson (President, British
Veterinary Association).

He claimed "no amount of research can make up

for a quick diagnosis by the man on the land, who is really the key to
any disease prevention.
Dr Gibson's view was supported by Mr K. A. Doyle, Assistant
Director General, Animal Quarantine, Department of Health, at the ANAHL
Forum.

He stated:
"I think what we ought to be doing, in fact it is
really amazing that we are not doing it now, is
educating farmers in the recognition of FMD and other
vesicular diseases. This ought to be done as a
matter of urgency."'^

An important distinction which needs to be drawn, is between
training which requires maximum security facilities and other training
methods.
At the PWC Hearing Dr Snowdon stated:
"The training of field staff in the recognition and
presumptive diagnosis of exotic diseases requires
maximum security animal accommodation where animals
can be infected and examined by field staff and a
presumptive diagnosis, based on clinical features
given. This work can only be undertaken in maximum
security facilities."'°
An alternative not recognised by Dr Snowdon in this statement is
the training which does not rely on the infection of live animals with
the virus and which, therefore, does not require a laboratory such as
ANAHL.

The current training methods used in Australia include lectures,

written information, audiovisuals as well as attendance at overseas
outbreaks and overseas training courses by selected personnel.

Opponents of training using live virus to infect animals have
argued that, not only do audiovisuals, etc., provide an adequate
alternative, but in some ways are superior even leaving aside
consideration of the risk factor involved in the infection of large
numbers of animals and the participation of large numbers of observers.
At the ANAHL Forum Professor Blood (Melbourne University)
stated:

"I am involved in training ... videotape has all the advantages

... I would suggest to you that it is better than being in the animal
room." ^^ Good audiovisuals, he claimed can cover the whole spectrum and
"it is much better to have a whole galaxy of visual aids showing all the
signs, all the lesions that may appear from the very least to the very
worst, than it is to see one microcosm of it in the rather artificial
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circumstances of a laboratory."

He also pointed out that a

"disadvantage of looking at a disease in an ANAHL cubicle is that you do
not see the herd.

You do not see the epidemiology of the disease.79 I

think the epidemiology is probably more important than the rest."
Continuing with his evidence to the PWC, Dr Snowdon claimed "the
only alternative [to undertaking a training programme
at ANAHL] is to
80
have personnel trained in overseas laboratories."

The next step in

his argument was to show that this was an unsatisfactory alternative, an
argument that was also used for promoting the need for ANAHL to undertake diagnosis and vaccine production. Dr Snowdon maintained
"the opportunities for training overseas are limited,
whereas constant training of most field veterinarians
in the recognition of exotic diseases is required.
This could only be undertaken, on the scale required,
in an Ai^tralian maximum security laboratory such as
ANAHL."^^
So in 1974 at the PWC Hearing, the CSIRO maintained that the only

alternative to training veterinarians at ANAHL was to train them in
overseas laboratories.

This alternative was considered unsuitable

because only a few could attend each year.
However in its April 1982 Report, the CSIRO recognised the use of
overseas outbreaks as another means of training but saw cost and the
limited disease range as disadvantages:
"Another method of training is to send officers
overseas to assist in disease control program. This
has limitations because officers do not see the full
range of diseases with which they could be confronted
in Australia. It is also expensivaoconsidering the
number of officers to be trained."
Mr Gee in the BAH Report maintained that:

i

"the best training is to

have people participate in major exotic disease outbreaks" but the
limitation he saw was that "such training has to be restricted to a few
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key people."
But the. CSIRO Ferguson Report stated:
"The argument that first-hand experience in FMD
outbreak situations is one of the best forms of
training is invalid. While opportunistic use might
be made of outbreaks in some situations, it would
rarely be feasible to do so in neighbouring countries
such as Burma or Thailand. Moreover, every visit to
an outbreak or to a farm in an affected country
entails some risk of bringing the disease back to
Australia - a risk greater, in the Committee's view,
than the possibility of escape through training
g^^
courses in the totally-controlled situation in ANAHL."
The Ferguson Report relied heavily on Mr Doyle's submission to the
Review Committee to support the case for training at ANAHL.
quoted as saying:

Mr Doyle is

"audiovisuals alone do not provide the insight

into the diseases that handling infected animals does.

... Reliance on

other countries for this type of training, ... is most unwise, as
courses are unlikely to be available on a regular basis in the future."
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However at the ANAHL Forum, Mr Doyle concluded his speech by saying:

"The veterinary knowledge and skill of being able to
make at least some sort of tentative clinical
diagnosis and ensuring that all the right actions are
taken is, of course, of very great importance. I
think first class lectures appropriately illustrated
with still and movie films developed overseas will be
an excellent way of educating Australia's large field
veterinary force. Selected staff from ANAHL and
State Departments would continue to be sent overseas
to work in FMD outbreaks and gain first hand
experience. Mr Gee has always emphasised the very
great importance of that particular experience. This
experience should be obtained both in the field and
in the laboratory and where possible from attending
courses in vesicular disggse diagnosis conducted from
time to time overseas."

;

So it would seem that those advocating a training function, whilst
agreeing on the basis of the need for this function, i.e., facilitating
an early diagnosis, differ in their evaluation and criticism of possible
al ternatives.
The Australian National Cattlemen's Council submission to the PWC
recognised training as a valid function of ANAHL but interpreted its
value as training personnel in other countries:

"The presence of the

ANAHL would greatly speed up the rate at which such diseases [i.e. FMD]
could be eradicated from countries that have close geographical
proximity to Australia, as it would be possible

to train laboratory

staff and veterinarians from these countries in methods of producing
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vaccines and in general disease control."
The ASTEC Report presented the various arguments for and against
the various training methods.
Overseas Outbreaks

These arguments can be summarised as:

.

difficult to arrange

.

danger of bringing back disease

.

may have different hosts, symptoms and method
of spread to Australia.

Overseas Courses

.

few places

.

costly

.

laboratory symptoms may differ from symptoms in
the field

Audio Visuals

.

does not give "herd picture'

.

able to follow the development of the disease.

.

No "hands-on" experience

.

able to show a wide range of clinical symptoms
In different host species at one session.

The ASTEC Committee also recognised the risks involved concluding
that "training courses, using deliberately infected livestock, probably
represent the greatest challenge to the microbiological security of
ANAHL."
Whilst accepting the need for training, the ASTEC Committee
concluded that "the benefits should be carefully weighed against the
risks before a decision is taken whether to infect livestock for
oq
training purposes."
It could be argued that a training function was proposed in order to
add weight to the argument for the establishment of ANAHL, rather than in
response to a clearly defined need.

Although training was not included

in the original proposal for the establishment of a maximum security
animal health laboratory, by the time the proposal went before the PWC,
the training function had been established and elaborated.
The arguments presented, showing the importance of early diagnosis
appear valid and are confirmed by overseas experience where misdiagnoses
have resulted in delays and spread of outbreaks.

However these

arguments do not necessarily demonstrate a need for ANAHL to undertake
this training.
The safety and wisdom of infecting large numbers of animals
with exotic diseases, and the involvement of large numbers of people
unskilled in methods of microbiological security was not questioned
by the PWC.

Furthermore, the role of the primary producer as the first

line of defence was overlooked, with training directed at veterinary
officers only.
In their zeal to justify training at ANAHL as a valid function and
to demonstrate the inadequacies of any alternatives, the proponents of
the training function tended to produce conflicting and contradictory
arguments.
It would seem that training was included

as a function of ANAHL to

provide an on-going activity for the facility outside a disease outbreak
situation.

Thus training helps to justify the cost of ANAHL by showing

that it will be usefully functioning all the time.

The claim that this

training will result in earlier, more accurate diagnosis, thus
accelerating an eradication programme, which would mean reduced economic
losses, is also used to provide a further economic justification for
training at ANAHL.

RESEARCH FUNCTION

In overseas animal disease laboratories such as Plum Island and
Pirbright, research constitutes about 75% of their effort.

Although the

prime function of ANAHL was to be diagnosis, research had been
recognised as a major part of ANAHL's operation and it was on this basis
that the CSIRO was invited to manage and staff ANAHL.^^
The arguments promoting research at ANAHL, like the arguments for
training, add weight to the justification for ANAHL since the facility
can be seen to be functioning between outbreak situations.
Although research had been accepted as a valid function for ANAHL
by the PWC, more recently there has been a questioning of what constitutes appropriate research.

As a result of this questioning a change

has been made in the type of research to be undertaken at ANAHL.

This

change was not based on scientific arguments, but on the economic
grounds that the operating costs of ANAHL were such that only research
requiring maximum-security facilities should be undertaken there, and
because it was feared that the funding of other animal disease research
laboratories in Australia would be adversely affected.
The first mention of a research function came in the IDC Report of
1970 where it was recommended that research work on indigenous virus
diseases be undertaken.
Panel list of functions.

This recommendation was included in the AAC
In the CSIRO submission to the PWC, Dr Pierce

argued that ANAHL needed to engage in research in order to better
perform its diagnostic function.

"The only satisfactory way of ensuring the continuing
presence of a team of the calibre required is for the
laboratory to have a continuous involvement in
relevant research in this and closely related fields.
In this way, the laboratory, which would represent a
considerable capital investment, would be effectively
used at all times and would also be in a state of
readiness at all times for an emergency."
Dr Snowdon in his evidence to the PWC stated that it is intended
that ANAHL should "undertake research into indigenous and exotic
diseases of livestock". ^^ He later expanded this point.

"There are two

main reasons for carrying out research into endemic virus diseases?
within ANAHL.

The first is to develop techniques for the rapid differ-

entiation of endemic and exotic diseases ... The second reason for
carrying out research into endemic diseases is to ensure that the staff
is at a high state of preparedness when called upon during an outbreak
of an exotic disease.

To keep morale high staff must be actively

participating in research programs and before exotic diseases are introduced these programs are best undertaken with endemic diseases where
results can be directly applied within A u s t r a l i a . I n

these

arguments there appears to be a confusion between the research role and
diagnostic role and the assumption is made that a good diagnostician
will also be a good research scientist.

Dr Kesteven (former Consultant

to the Department of Agriculture) pointed out that "successful planning
for the control of disease must be done by specialists in this field,
which is a very different discipline from academic research;

the

experienced disease control expert draws on the results of academic
Qd
research and puts them into practical use."^
The Australian National Cattleman's Council in their submission to the
PWC urged that research be carried out on endemic diseases and they even

specified particular diseases of interest:
"It is understood that a team of highly qualified
virologists will be maintained at the laboratory and
... they will be in a position to undertake research
into a number of endemic diseases of significance to
the cattle industry. The most important of these is
ephermeral fever, that has been present in Australia
for only a few years yet has been responsible for
production losses, especially in Northern Australia.
It is also understood that Murray Valley
encephalitis, that has recently been responsible for
a number of deaths in humans in Australia, could be
carried by domestic animals and thus it will be in
the national interest for research to be undertaken
on this disease with the idea of seeking an
appropriate vaccine.

*

It is understood that cost-benefit studies have
been undertaken by the Bureau of Agricultural
Economics, demonstrating that the capital cost of the
laboratory together with the annual operating costs
can be more than justified in the terms qf the
eradication of endemic viral diseases." ^^
The PWC Report concluded that ANAHL, "Will undertake a continuingresearch program into indigenous and exotic diseases of livestock to
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ensure that the staff are fully trained to meet any emergency."
The first deviation from the PWC statement is contained in the
CSIRO Report Live Exotic Disease Agents ^

ANAHL.

(The 1981 CSIRO

publication ANAHL: A Summary of the History of the ANAHL, Its
Development and Future Operation lists the functions of ANAHL exactly
as given by the PWC.)

Whilst stating that "the following functions were

approved as being appropriate for ANAHL by the PWC" the wording of the
research function was changed to "undertake research into those animal
diseases requiring laboratory facilities of high microbiological
security with emphasis to be given to exotic diseases which are a
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potential danger to Australia's livestock industries."
This amendment to the research function, using exactly the same

wording was also made by Dr Snowdon in an article in Animal Quarantine.^^
The change was finally made explicit in the CSIRO Ferguson Report when
it was stated that, "The Committee sees no need to work on indigenous
viruses as this work can be safely done in less secure laboratories."^^
As mentioned in the Introduction, Dr Lascelles, in 1976, expressed
concern regarding the financing of endemic disease programmes at ANAHL.
He saw this function as competing for resources with other laboratories
within the CSIRO.

This argument gained support especially within the
i

CSIRO and became known as the "Resources Issue".

In a submission to the

Ferguson Committee (1982) Dr Southcott, an Assistant Chief of the
Division of Animal Health, said:
"ANAHL will be a most costly facility to operate and
will almost certainly distort spending on
agricultural research in Australia. Should CSIRO be
forced to continue in a managerial role, the
biological and agricultural Divisions would be
hardest hit but other parts of the Organisation would
also be affected."
It would appear that in recognition of this opposition, the CSIRO
made a shift of emphasis in the research function of ANAHL.

This

assertion seems to be borne out by the ASTEC Report of December 1982.
It recommended that "in general ANAHL should not undertake research on
endemic animal diseases" lOland it justified this recommendation on the
grounds of the resources issue.

It stated "some opposition is based on

a fear of reduced financial support.

It should be possible to allay

such fears on the grounds that the main role of ANAHL is to undertake
102

research and development on exotic diseases."
In September 1982, at a time when the CSIRO was shifting away from
endemic disease research, the BAH Report stated: "ANAHL will extend
103
endemic disease research."
This would suggest that either the BAH was

not subjected to the same pressure as the CSIRO or was not influenced by
this pressure.
Endemic disease research was originally promoted as an end in
itself, providing advantages to the livestock industry as well as a
justification for the establishment of ANAHL.

Research was later

extended to include exotic disease research and finally limited to
exotic disease research.

The decision that endemic disease research was

not appropriate for a facility like ANAHL raised the question of wh«t
does constitute appropriate research for ANAHL.
The ASTEC Report listed as animal disease organisms of potential
priority for importation once ANAHL is commissioned:
Bluetongue
Newcastle Disease
Rabies
Swine Vesicular Disease
Vesicular Exanthema
104

Vesicular Stomatitis.

However the BAH Report listed exotic disease agents already in
Australia and included among the major animal disease agents were:
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DISEASE AGENT

HELD AT

YEAR OF IMPORTATION

Bluetongue virus

CSL

Rabies virus

CSL

Newcastle disease

CSIRO

1932

Fowl Plague viruses

CSIRO

1976

Aujeszky's Disease virus

Institute of Medical

1976

and Veterinary
Science, Adelaide

1979

Swine Fever virus

CSIRO

1961

Brucella species

National Biological

'

Standards Laboratory,
Department of Health.

Thus it would appear that research is currently being undertaken on
exotic animal disease viruses without the facilities of ANAHL.

This

would seem to suggest that ANAHL is really only necessary for research
work on FMD, yet in an address to the Rural Press Club in Brisbane on
the 6th August, 1982, Dr Snowdon stated:

"There are a number of inter-

nationally recognised laboratories carrying out research on FMD and it
is not intended to carry out an intensive research programme on FMD at
ANAHL" and he repeated this at the ANAHL Forum.^^^
Dr Lascelles (Chief, Division of Animal Health, CSIRO) who was
invited to speak on the topic of research at the ANAHL Forum stated that
FMD research is a
"very generously researched area globally speaking
and especially so in recent years. Enormous
resources are being put into it. Some of the world's
best scientists have been attracted to it and

developments are occurring at an extremely rapid
rate. ... I do not believe that Australia can
afford to duplicate research when it is being done so
well elsewhere ... I conclude that it would be totally
inappropriate at this time for scarce national
resources to be committed to research on FMD, a
disease not present in this country and one in which
the global effort is so large and progress so rapid.
The BAH Report also stated: "ANAHL need not repeat, with diseases
108

such as FMD, research that has already been done extensively overseas."
For once the proponents and opponents of ANAHL were in agreement,
but the result would appear to be that ANAHL is left without a

'

justifiable research function.
Once again the PWC accepted the CSIRO arguments that research would
provide an on-going function for ANAHL and that economic benefits to the
livestock industry, and thus Australia's economy in general, as a result
of advances in research, would follow.

In order to further strengthen -

their arguments, the CSIRO claimed that an on-going research prograirane
was essential to attract high calibre scientists who would be necessary
should an outbreak occur, and to provide them with a continuing interest
and maintain microbiological security measures.
However in the face of later opposition based on economic
arguments, the CSIRO altered its stance and recommended that ANAHL work
only on exotic disease research.

So the area of research interest was

considerably narrowed from that proposed at the PWC. In view of the fact
that other laboratories in Australia are already working with some
important exotic viruses, as well as the general agreement that ANAHL
should not work on FMD (not just on the grounds of safety but also on
the grounds of duplication of research), it would appear that ANAHL is
not necessary for undertaking research.

However a research function

would appear to be necessary for ANAHL in order to attract staff and
keep their interest and to provide a continuous role for the facility.

THE VACCINE PRODUCTION FUNCTION
FMD is a virus disease which, unlike diseases caused by bacteria,
cannot be cured once it is established.^®^

The official policy for the

control of an outbreak in Australia is prompt slaughter and sanitary
disposal of infected animals;

disinfection of affected property;

prevention of movement of animals, animal products or other goods from
adjacent areas;

and careful monitoring of surrounding animals.^^^
i

The slaughter eradication policy has been adopted by FMD-free
countries because of the difficulties associated with vaccination,
especially when the export market depends on freedom from the disease.
An animal successfully immunised against a particular sub-type of virus
can later become a symptomless carrier if infected by another, thus
making it impossible to guarantee freedom from the disease in the
vaccinated region.
Advocates of vaccination in Australia stress that its use would not
be an alternative to a "slaughter-out" programme, but would complement
it in certain situations.

They argue that "ring vaccination" (where

animals around the perimeter of an outbreak are vaccinated) could be
used if an outbreak was spreading faster than cotild be managed, or if it
was discovered that FMD was established and widespread in livestock and
feral animals in the large remote areas of Northern Australia.

Once

the spread had been checked, vaccinated animals would then need to be
slaughtered in order to re-establish FMD-free status for trade purposes.
Opponents claim that quarantine and slaughter would be adequate for
any outbreak and that the disadvantages, costs and risks of vaccination
outweigh any potential benefits.

Present-day FMD vaccines use inactivated virus particles but
research, using recombinant DNA techniques, is being carried out in an
attempt to develop a safe alternative;

safe, not only to manufacture

since live virus is not required, but safe to use since there is no
danger of the vaccine containing improperly inactivated virus.
The Australian Academy of Science, in their May 1983 Report recognised that "the question of the preparation and use of vaccines for FMD
is one of the most controversial issues." ^^^

'

The reports on ANAHL made prior to the PWC Hearing, i.e., the
Eichhorn Report, the CSVC report and the report of the AAC Panel, but
not the IDC Report, recommended that vaccine production and testing be
included as a function of ANAHL.
The PWC Report concluded that "the only way in which Australia can
guarantee the availability of vaccine, in the event of an outbreak of
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FMD is to have its own maximum-security vaccine-producing facilities."^
There are two points to consider in this statement:

first,

whether or not the only way of obtaining guaranteed supplies is by
producing the vaccine at ANAHL, and secondly whether or not Australia
would ever use FMD vaccine in the event of an outbreak.
In order to establish this first point, the arguments used at the
PWC Hearing were that:
1.

The Animal Virus Research Institute, World Reference Laboratory,
Pirbright, England, is the only acceptable manufacturer of FMD
vaccine.

2.

Pirbright may be unreliable because:
a)

it may have to deal with outbreaks in Britain at the time;

or

b)

it may be committed to vaccine production for another country.

3.

Pirbright may be unwilling to manufacture the vaccine if:
a)

it involves a new sub-type not previously encountered in
Britain or Europe;

b)

or

the laboratory changed its policy regarding the manufacture of
vaccines for other countries.

4.

Obtaining vaccines from Pirbright would be costly.

5.

Stockpiling of vaccines is not a practical solution because:

i

a)

the shelf-life is only short;

b)

a large range of vaccines would need to be stored to cover the
various types and sub-types;

c)

and

this would result in high costs.

Dr Snowdon and Dr Pierce of the CSIRO presented these arguments in
their submissions and during questioning at the PWC hearing to
substantiate the need for a vaccine production unit at ANAHL.

In his

section of the CSIRO submission, Dr Snowdon pointed out that many
countries will not permit the introduction of strains of virus that
do not occur naturally in that country and therefore would not be able
to produce vaccines of all the sub-types. Also some laboratories would be
unacceptable because of their low standards of potency and safety
testing. ^^^ He concluded

"At present, England is the only country that

could manufacture vaccines against any strain of FMD virus in commercial
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quantities." ^^
The CSIRO submission emphasised that Pirbright was the only
possible manufacturer of vaccine, but always following this claim was the
consideration of a factor which would limit Australia's reliance on
Pirbright.

F o l l o w i n g the above quote, Dr Snowdon c o n t i n u e d
"The p o s s i b i l i t y o f c o n t r a c t i n g w i t h the company i n
England t h a t makes FMD vaccine t o supply vaccine i n
times o f emergency has been i n v e s t i g a t e d , b u t because
o f t h e costs i n v o l v e d and the d i f f i c u l t i e s o f
guaranteeing s u p p l i e s i n times o f emergejriqy, t h i s
a l t e r n a t i v e was not developed f u r t h e r . "
Dr P i e r c e o f t h e CSIRO i n evidence s t a t e d " i n the event o f having
t o v a c c i n a t e a g a i n s t FMD, A u s t r a l i a would be s o l e l y dependent on the
production f a c i l i t i e s at P i r b r i g h t .

These f a c i l i t i e s could w e l l be
'

committed a t the time t o p r o d u c t i o n o f vaccine f o r another c o u n t r y . "
In another p a r t o f h i s submission, Dr P i e r c e r a i s e d two more
arguments.
" A t p r e s e n t the o n l y place i n the w o r l d where
A u s t r a l i a c o u l d have an acceptable FMD v a c c i n e
prepared t o combat an outbreak would be P i r b r i g h t ,
England. Too much r e l i a n c e should n o t be placed on
the a v a i l a b i l i t y o f these f a c i l i t i e s .
P i r b r i g h t has
no o v e r - r i d i n g commitment t o A u s t r a l i a and would be
i n no p o s i t i o n t o consider an A u s t r a l i a n r e q u e s t f o r
FMD vaccine i f i t were committed t o coping w i t h an
outbreak i n B r i t a i n .
In a d d i t i o n , t h e r e i s no
guarantee t h a t P i r b r i g h t would be prepared, a t some
f u t u r e d a t e , t o manufacture vaccine f o r A u s t r a l i a i f
i t i n v o l v e d a s t r a i n o f FMD v i r u s n e t p r e v i o u s l y
encountered i n B r i t a i n o r E u r o p e . " ^ ^ ^
This l a t t e r p o i n t was expanded by Dr Pierce i n response t o a
question during cross-examination.

He s t a t e d :

" P i r b r i g h t r e a l l y has no r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r
m a n u f a c t u r i n g v a c c i n e . We f e e l t h a t i f they d i d ,
they would do so because they are sympathetic t o the
A u s t r a l i a n problem. We have helped the U n i t e d
Kingdom on occasions when they have experienced
problems w i t h s e r i o u s outbreaks o f FMD. But i f they
were i n d i f f i c u l t i e s w i t h Europe, then I t h i n k they
would put i t s problems f i r s t .
And secondly, we have
some a n x i e t y t h a t w i t h the e n t r y o f B r i t a i n i n the
Common Market, the same s o r t of r e s t r i c t i o n s which
are placed on research i n s t i t u t i o n s i n Europe and
A f r i c a , i n t h a t they w i l l not accept v i r u s s t r a i n s
they do n o t experience i n t h e i r own c o u n t r i e s , might
a l s o be a p p l i e d t o the United Kingdom. We a l r e a d y
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have some evidence that the Department of Health I
think, might be able to elaborate on, that some
pressure is in fact already being put on the UK, not
to import into Eurooe^ Asian strains which they have
never experienced."
This claim suggests that Pirbright may not even be prepared to test
samples from outbreaks let alone manufacture vaccines for a different
strain of FMD virus.
Mr Kelly of the PWC Committee, apparently recognising this implication of Dr Pierce's statement, asked what we would do if the British
would not do our testing.

Dr Snowdon, not Dr Pierce, replied,

"I would

like to make this comment, that there is a big difference between doing
n9
a confirmatory diagnosis and producing vaccine.

Pirbright, he pointed

out, does not know what sort of virus strains are in the samples until
they are tested and so "would have to give up her responsibility as a
reference laboratory for the whole world for diagnosis if we take that
line of argument that she cannot take material from foreign countries
producing vaccine, a tremendous difference, because in the production of
vaccine that was not present in Europe you are producing huge quantities
of virus during the vaccine production cycle with the danger that it may
escape."
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This information about the risk associated with vaccine production
passed the PWC Committee without comment and there was no other
reference made to the comparative risks associated with diagnosis and
vaccine production in any of the submissions to the PWC.
In anticipation of the argument that vaccine could be produced
overseas and stored at ANAHL in readiness, rather than supplied in an
emergency situation, another set of arguments were developed. Dr Snowdon

argued against stockpiling on the grounds that the shelf-life of
inactivated vaccine is only 6-12 months and therefore supplies would
need to be constantly replaced.

Also, because of the number of types

and sub-types of FMD virus (seven main types and more than eighty sub121
types) "large volumes of a whole range of vaccines"

would need to be

stored, and this, the CSIRO claimed, would be too expensive.
These were put forward by Dr Snowdon as the main difficulties
with
i
stockpiling.

But the argument, that stockpiling would not cover

the possibility of an outbreak being caused by a new strain was not used
at this stage.
In the CSIRO Submission Dr Pierce stated "The most successful
vaccine is usually that prepared from the virus type or sub-type
isolated from the outbreak, so that it would be necessary to stockpile
large volumes of a whole range of vaccines and maintain
them permanently
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refrigerated for use against a single disease."

There is no

suggestion in this statement that a new and unknown type would be
involved.
The CSIRO Ferguson Report stated: "In 1971-72 discussions were held
with an overseas vaccine manufacturer about the possibility of it producing and holding stocks of vaccine for use by Australia.

At that

time, the capital and recurrent costs were regarded as unacceptable, as
were the risks of repudiation of an agreement in exceptional circumstances." ^^^ No estimation of the cost involved or a comparison with
the cost of producing the vaccine at ANAHL were given, nor was there any
suggestion that a new strain of virus would be involved.

The arguments

were based only on costs and unreliability.
The Ferguson Report also noted that "an alternative to the pro-

Ill

duction of FMD vaccines at ANAHL would be for Australia to share in a
world bank of vaccines.

Australia has participated in discussions on

this proposal with the OIE and FAO over the past seven years.

Little

progress has been made, and the prospect of agreement seems remote.
Meanwhile various countries such as the USA and Japan are developing

1
their own vaccine stockpiles." ^'•^This would suggest that the CSIRO
arguments against stockpiling vaccines given at the PWC Hearing did not
hold during these discussions from 1975-1982 and were not considered
drawbacks by Japan and USA.

Furthermore, the CSIRO in its booklet How

would we cope with an Outbreak of FMD promoted the idea of stockpiling.
It stated:

"The Officer-in-Charge of ANAHL, after the laboratory was

commissioned and approved as being microbiologically secure, had started
manufacturing, testing arid stockpiling vaccines for the type of FMD
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virus that he judged most likely to enter Australia."
The suggestion from the PWC evidence was that a supply of all the
sub-types of vaccines would need to be stored, yet this CSIRO publication
stated "probably about twelve different vaccines would be needed to
control all forms of FMD.
then went on to say
"if vaccine was needed before they could develop one
from the field strain itself, the one in store,
although not ideal, would suffice. Meanwhile samples
of the field strain had been dispatched to Pirbright,
UK, the world reference centre for FMD viruses, for
sub-typing. At ANAHL, scientists were building up
stocks of the field-strain virus in laboratory tissue
culture for the purpose of manufacturing a vaccine
from it on a large scale. But they would need about
three month^^efore they could supply this vaccine in
quantity."
This period of three months appears an optimistic one
the BAH Report which stated

in view of

"The process of developing seeds and substrates for
manufacture and scaling-up to production is timeconsuming. At the CSL, bluetongue vaccine seed
preparation has taken several years and is not yet
complete. It is too late to leave this until an
exotic disease outbreak has started. Developmental
work should be undertaken in advance of an outbreak.
Such development could be under^ken at considerable
expense overseas or at ANAHL."^^^
Yet until an outbreak occurs the strain of virus is unknown and
therefore developmental work cannot be undertaken.
i

The PWC conclusions were based on CSIRO evidence that Pirbright was
the only source but was unreliable in an emergency.

However it was

made apparent at the ANAHL Forum that neither Pirbright or Plum Island
were self sufficient in vaccine production but purchased their
stockpiles from commercial manufacturers.
Dr Brown (Pirbright) stated:
commercial manufacturers.
you really needed it.

"You can always buy vaccines from

Any firm would sell their vaccine to you if

Pirbright holds a stockpile on behalf of the

Ministry, which is produced by Wellcome.

Pirbright does not have its
1 ?Q

own facility for producing millions of doses.
Dr Call is (Plum Island) stated:

"Plum Island has a small vaccine

production capability- something we estimate to be capable of producing
three to five million doses of whole virus vaccine per year.

The

vaccine which is in storage and which belongs to my Government and that
of Canada and Mexico was purchased both from Plum Island and on the
international market.

A Laboratory in Europe won the contract to

produce seven million d o s e s . F r o m

these statements it would appear

that Pirbright itself would not be a source of supply, and that a
variety of sources were available.
Stockpiling, which could overcome the unreliability argument, was

considered unsatisfactory and too costly by the

PWC.

But a change in

strategy occurred when it became apparent that ANAHL would be engaged in
stockpiling vaccines, thus eliminating another part of the CSIRO
argument.
The emphasis was then placed on the likelihood of the outbreak
being caused by a new, unknown strain of virus. The Ferguson Report argued
that "an overseas stockpile of vaccines
against the major FMD sub-types does not cover the eventuality th§t they
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may not protect stock against the outbreak strain",

but then neither

does manufacturing and stockpiling vaccines at ANAHL prior to an
outbreak.

And it is not explained why Australia should experience a new

strain of virus when the dangers of an outbreak are supposedly
associated with the accidental introduction of the virus from overseas
by livestock or livestock products.
The CSIRO, in evidence to the PWC, claimed that many countries would
not be prepared to manufacture vaccines using a strain not experienced
by them and that even Pirbright may be unwilling to do this in the
future, but on the other hand it was encouraging Australia to produce and
stockpile a range of vaccines despite being free from FMD altogether.
The ASTEC Report concluded that "it has not been demonstrated that
adequate supplies (of FMD vaccine) could not be obtained, or made under
contract, overseas and to standards of potency and safety acceptable
to Australian authorities" and that "having vaccine manufactured
overseas may appear expensive, but, in fact, the vaccine is generally
only a small

proportion of the total cost of an immunisation campaign."

At the ANAHL Forum (August 1982) Professor B. Morris stated that:
"adequately tested FMD vaccines are available in
large quantities commercially and these commercially

132

produced vaccines are the ones bought and stockpiled
by the Pirbright and Plum Island (USA) laboratories.
If these labs are prepared to buy in vaccines there
can be no case for Australia to begin making them.
Further, we heard from Dr Brown (Deputy Director Pirbright) and Dr Callis (Director, Plum Island) that
new generations of synthetic FMD vaccines, produced
from non-infective material by recombinant DNA and
organic synthetic techniques will be available in the
next few years. It is sad, but entirely predictable,
that the planning of ANAHL in relation to FMD vaccinq33
production has been bypassed by the new immunology."
The second point to consider in relation to the vaccine production
function is whether or not Australia would ever use FMD vaccine.

There

has been much debate recently on this point because of its relevance to
the importation of live FHD virus.
A vaccine production facility has always been included in the
design of ANAHL, apparently at a considerable cost.

The Department of

Works pointed out to the PWC that the microbiologically secure areas are
a complex which must be built at the one time;

"it is no good saying
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you will leave the vaccine laboratory till a later stage".

Dr Pierce

stated during questioning at the PWC Hearing that "one of the rather
expensive parts of the facility is related
to the need for safety,
135
particularly in vaccine production."
But as the CSIRO had made
1 "^fi
clear,
that FMD.

the CSL can manufacture vaccines from viruses less virulent
The CSL has previously manufactured smallpox vaccine, is

currently working with bluetongue virus vaccine, and has had "over sixty
years experience in producing and testing medical and veterinary
137
vaccines."
Thus the only reason for a vaccine production unit at ANAHL is to
produce FMD vaccine.

In order to justify this facility it is necessary

to, not only promote ANAHL as the only reliable source of vaccine, but

to promote the use of vaccination as part of the control programme.
There seems to be some confusion about the importance of the
vaccine production function.

The CSIRO Report, Live Exotic Disease

Agents at ANAHL, April 1982, stated:

"one of the main reasons for

constructing ANAHL was to give Australia a facility capable of allowing
FMD virus to be studied with safety and with the capacity to produce
FMD vaccine."
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Yet in a CSIRO News Release, Or Wild (Chairman) said
139

"vaccine production will be a minor function of ANAHL".

i
At the ANAHL

Forum held in August 1982, Dr Boardman (CSIRO Executive Member) stated
"there has been no decision by
140the CSIRO Executive to go ahead with the
vaccine production facility."
The CSIRO Ferguson Committee Report of
November 1982 maintained that "ANAHL would be the only absolutely
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reliable source of vaccine against the outbreak strain."
Apparently the use of FMD vaccine was considered a possibility from
the time ANAHL was first discussed in 1964, since vaccine production and
testing were included in the original functions for the laboratory and
in subsequent reports.

Yet a reading of more recent reports suggests

that it is only with the advent of improve^nts in vaccines and control
methods that vaccination has become a possible method of control for
Australia.
At the PWC Hearing Senator Melzer asked Mr Gee (Department of
Health):

"Would you agree with the CSIRO opinion that if there was an

outbreak of, say, FMD in Australia at the Boment our only recourse would
be to kill the animals concerned and not worry about using vaccines?"
Mr Gee:

Sure.

All our control plans, all our eradication plans are

based on a slaughter policy.

We would only use vaccination if

we were really pushed to the wall;

if it was out of control or

in too large an area;

if we thought we needed a ring buffer

of vaccinated animals to help us control it.

I think it is

unlikely that we would ever have to use vaccination but I
would not way that it would never be possible Senator Melzer:

It would be a last resort?
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Mr Gee:

It would be a last resort, yes."

In answer to a question Dr Pierce gives a lengthy answer on Irhe
disadvantages of vaccination.
"First of all you have to remember that a
country has an advantage in being free of disease.
This is an advantage in that, particularly as an
exporting country--more so in Australia than in the
United Kingdom--we export from a country which is
free of foot and mouth disease. This is a great
economic advantage on world markets. Japan and the
United States welcome our meat probably—as much as
for any other reason--because it comes from a country
that is free from foot and mouth disease. Once you
begin to vaccinate your animals, you have a population which is general is immune. This means that
if foot and mouth comes into the country, it will not
necessarily declare itself immediately because a
proportion of your population resists it. The great
advantage of having the population fully susceptible
is that when you get an introduction--and these are
the considerations that the United Kingdom has taken
into account--the disease immediately declares
itself. You can immediately get on to it and hopefully you can immediately eradicate it and so maintain this ideal status of being disease-free. The
other consideration is that unfortunately the best of
foot and mouth vaccines is a poor one. In other
words, it is not as if you can vaccinate an animal
and then say that for the rest of its natural life it
is going to be immune. Really to immunise animals
effectively for all time, I would say—and my
colleague might wish to comment further on this--the
animals would ideally be vaccinated at least twice a
year. Remember that we are dealing with a disease to
which not only cattle are susceptible; pigs are
susceptible to it, goats are susceptible to it, sheep
are susceptible to it and cattle are susceptible to
it. If we assume that to maintain an immune population you have to vaccinate all those species twice

a year, in perpetuity, once you start, then we begin
to see why, from an economic point of view, it is
actually an advantage to withstand the enormous
losses which you may get in eradicating it than
trying to accept that the alternative is a preferable
one, of continuously vaccinating. Also remember, as
has already been mentioned, that the vaccine is not a
very effective one for pigs. Also remember that we
have a susceptible feral population of pigs, and
these are very difficult to get at to vaccinate. So,
once you determine to vaccinate you really are in
serious trouble if ever you want to regain the status
of disease-free. You are then committed to
vaccination and it would be extremely difficult to
get back to a situation of being disease-free which
is so advantageous to us. One might point out that
the United States would probably like to deal, for
its beef, with South American countries. They are
nearer; they are politically more interesting. But
they do have foot and mouth disease, and this gives
Australia the immense advantage with countries
. importing meat. Remembe»" that we are the biggest
exporters of meat in the world today."

*

Yet in the CSIRO submission Dr Snowdon said "Depending on where the
outbreak occurs, it may be necessary to vaccinate susceptible livestock
surrounding the outbreak to prevent the disease spreading to other
areas.

Thus the principal aim of the vaccination production unit in

ANAHL will be to produce vaccine that will be used to contain an
outbreak of FMD during the period it is being eradicated."
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It would appear that the submission contained a much stronger
statement that vaccination would be used than was evident during crossexamination.
The April 1982 CSIRO Report attempted to provide a rationale for
the use of vaccines in an eradication campaign.

It stated "the quality

and safety of vaccines available in 1970 was such that widespread
vaccination as a control measure in these circumstances would not have
been considered.

However this policy was reviewed in 1979 after consul-

tation with overseas authorities on the control of FMD ... The respons-

ibie Australian authorities now believe that vaccination might well be
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used in an eradication campaign under some circumstances."
But the circumstances noted are the same ones given at the 1974 PWC
hearing, namely if an explosive outbreak occurred in say the Gippsland
region or if an outbreak occurred in the remote areas of Northern
Australia.

The idea of using vaccination in Australia's remote areas

was first officially suggested by K. Mcintosh (Department of Health) at
the Australian Veterinary Association NSW Annual Conference in 1965, so
it is hardly a new idea or because of improvements in methods of
control.
The CSIRO Ferguson Report also refers to the change in current
thinking regarding vaccination.

It stated:

"It is now accepted [by organisations such as
International Office of Epozootics (OIE), Pan
American FMD Centre and Food and Agriculture
Organisation of the United Nations (FAO)] that early
vaccination could be an important component in
eradication, even in the case of the introduction of
infection J^to a country previously free from the
disease." ^^^
The Report continued:

"The Committee suggests that it should now be

accepted that vaccination in conjunction with slaughter may be part of the
campaign for the eradication of an outbreak of FMD."^^^
At the ANAHL Forum, Dr Callis (Director of Plum Island) quoted FAO
figures indicating that 40% of the outbreaks of FMD in Europe "were due to
virus in vaccines, i.e., improper inactivation".^^^

Dr Brown (Deputy

Director, Pirbright) disputed these figures claiming he had seen figures
which ranged from 75% to 100% but he maintained "there is no evidence at
all for any of these figures.

There is only one proven case and that was

the one in 1981 (on the Isle of Wight)."

Dr Brown continued:

"If we had

believed the gossip and the FAO and OIE statements we may have been saying
the German outbreak was caused by the German laboratory nearby or the
Danish outbreak.

It was not caused by either of those.

It was caused by a

virus, the source of which we do not know." ^^^
It is an interesting anomaly that the FAO and OIE, according to Dr
Brown, overestimated the role of faulty vaccines in their reports, yet
according to the CSIRO these same bodies are now advocating the wider
use of vaccination as an adjunct to slaughter even in previously FMDfree countries.

However the December 1981 edition of Rural Research, a

CSIRO quarterly would suggest that the CSIRO held different views at
that time.

In a seven page section on ANAHL there was no mention of

vaccine production at ANAHL apart from the one sentence:

"In the futiire

Australia may produce its own FMD vaccines by genetic engineering, or
import them." ^^^ This same article stated that with existing vaccines
there "is always a risk of them being contaminated with active live
virus" and that "if vaccination is resorted to in an eradication
campaign, it may delay an official declaration that Australia is free of
the disease for months or years." ^^^
Even if we ignore the arguments against using vaccination as part of
a control programme it seems unlikely that ANAHL could produce enough
vaccine for the specified situations i.e., an explosive outbreak in cattle
intensive areas or a widespread outbreak in remote areas.
The unit at ANAHL was designed to produce 200,000 doses per month.
When questioned by the PWC about how this figure was reached Dr Snowdon
replied:
"This figure was arrived at after consultation with
the various State disease control authorities. In

Other words, it was a figure which was arrived at on
information that they provided to us at that time and
we specifically went after this figure so that we
would know exactly what was required."
Senator Poyser: Have you made any projections on
what could be the maximum quantity of vaccine needed
at any given time?
Dr Snowdon: This is very difficult of course. You
have to think of hypothetical situations which may
arise - you may have a situation where the disease
may become widespread. You may have to increase the
size of the vaccine production unit to c&oe with it.
So it is a fairly difficult situation."

^

It seems doubtful that this production capacity (even if it were able
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to be doubled as is suggested by Dr Snowdon)

could provide sufficient

vaccine to cope with an explosive outbreak considering that in 1981-82
Australia's livestock included 25 million cattle, 136 million sheep and
2.4 million pigs.

If the outbreak was caused by a new strain of virus,

reserve stock could not be used and a new vaccine would need to be
developed.
According to Mr Gee "the USA is 153
laying down a strategic reserve of
twelve million doses of FMD vaccine".

Even at the rate of 400,000 doses

per month, ANAHL would require 2-1/2 years full-time operation to produce
that number of vaccines, and by the end of that 2-1/2 years more than half
the vaccines would have passed their expiry date.
The ASTEC Committee were not convinced by the arguments promoting
the advantages of vaccination in a control programme, seeing them as
"open to doubt".^^^ They stated:

"Under most circumstances, any animals

vaccinated in Australia would have to be slaughtered later, and it 155
may
be asked, why go to the trouble and expense of vaccination at all?"
They disputed the need for "ring vaccination" and its effectiveness and
maintained that slaughter was quicker and more effective than vaccination.

The Report concluded "only in the most exceptional circumstances would
FMD vaccine be used in Australia" and "even if the use of vaccines was
considered likely it would be necessary to show that no suitable supplies
could be obtained or produced under contract overseas before agreement was
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given for this high-risk operation to proceed at ANAHL."
A commitment to vaccine production was made from the time of the
earliest reports on ANAHL, and this commitment determined to a large
extent the design of ANAHL.

The arguments concerned with justifying the

inclusion of a vaccine production facility centre around two main points,
namely, whether Australia would ever use FMD vaccine and whether it could
reliably obtain vaccine from other sources.
The CSIRO used a variety of arguments at the PWC Hearing to demonstrate that overseas manufacturers would be unreliable, unsatisfactory or
too costly, both in an emergency situation and for the purposes of
stockpiling.

Overseas laboratories, they claimed, may not satisfy safety

standards, they may not permit the production of vaccine if it contains a
type of virus not previously encountered by them, they may be committed to
producing vaccine for other users at the time or they may choose not to
produce it for a variety of reasons such as war, politics or changes in
policy.

Stockpiling, which could potentially overcome some of these

limitations, was criticised on the grounds of the short shelf-life of the
vaccine, the large range that would need to be stored, and the cost these
would involve.

The possibility that the outbreak strain could be a new

variety of the virus received little attention at this time.
Evidence which seemed to contradict these arguments appeared to

pass the PWC Committee unquestioned, as did the problem of risk despite Dr
Snowdon having pointed out that vaccine production involved a much higher
risk than diagnosis.
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At the ANAHL Forum it was made clear that Pirbright was not the
only source of vaccine, and in fact, it was not a source of large
quantities at all since, it relied on commercial manufacturers as did the
USA.

The arguments demonstrating the disadvantages of stockpiling would

appear questionable given that Britain, Japan and USA were all stockpiling
large amounts of vaccine and that stockpiling was planned for ANAHL once
the production unit was functioning.
It would seem that once it became apparent that the arguments against
stockpiling and against obtaining vaccine from overseas suppliers were
inadequate, the CSIRO changed its emphasis and began to concentrate on
the argument that an outbreak could involve a previously unknown strain of
virus.

If this were the case, they argued, stockpiling would be

ineffective and some overseas laboratories may not be prepared to
manufacture the vaccine, but the CSIRO gave no evidence as to why an
outbreak would involve a new strain, nor did they demonstrate how the
vaccine production unit at ANAHL could produce enough vaccine in time to
be useful as a control measure.
The more basic question of whether Australia would, or should, use
FMD vaccine raised even greater difficulties for the advocates of vaccine
production at ANAHL.

In its submission to the PWC, the CSIRO gave no

indication of the problems associated with vaccination.

However during

questioning unequivocal statements were made about the risk and cost
involved if Australia used vaccination as a control measure.

This drew no

unfavourable comment from the PWC Committee and had no effect on the

approval of vaccine production as an appropriate function for ANAHL.
When this function was questioned, as a result of the controversy
over the importation and manipulation of live FMD virus prior to an
outbreak, the CSIRO argued that improved vaccines and new techniques in
disease control now favoured the use of vaccination as an adjunct to
slaughter.

However the ASTEC Committee was not convinced, reaffirming the

view that vaccination would only be used in "the most exceptional
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circumstances."
It was maintained by Dr Jones (Executive Officer, Australian'Meat
Research Committee) at the ANAHL Forum that the CSIRO was "stubbornly and
rather woodenly now insisting on the need to import [FMD] virus for the
purposes of making and stockpiling
160vaccine.

It seems to me that it has now

become an obsession with CSIRO."
However it could be argued that because the vaccine production unit
was an integral part of the design of ANAHL and was constructed, at great
cost especially to produce FMD vaccine, and since it could not
justifiably be used for any other purpose, that the CSIRO had to reaffirm
its commitment and find new arguments to justify this function in the face
of increasing opposition.

THE ROLE OF THE CSIRO
It would seem appropriate at this point to examine the role of the
CSIRO in relation to ANAHL.
The official statement of the function of the CSIRO is contained in
the CSIRO submission to the PWC:

"In October 1972 the Ministers for

Education and Science, Health, and Primary Industry made a joint submission to Cabinet recommending the acceptance, in principle, of the
i

establishment of a maximum security animal health laboratory to be
administered and operated by the CSIRO.
However, it would appear that the CSIRO was involved in some of the
investigations of the need for and functions of ANAHL prior to 1972, and
therefore played a role in decision making.

The Chief of the CSIRO was

a member of the Inter-Departmental Committee formed by the Minister of
Health to examine the proposal for an animal health laboratory.

The

Chairman of CSIRO was invited by the Chairman of the AAC Panel
(Secretary, Department of Primary Industry) to form a team to investigate the feasibility of establishing ANAHL.

The Chairman of CSIRO then

appointed the Chief of the Division of Animal Health CSIRO to form an
Advisory Proposal Committee comprising representatives of the CSIRO, the
Department of Health and the Department of Housing and Construction.
This Committee then formed a Proposal Evaluation Team (PET) comprising
the Officer-in-Charge designate of ANAHL, senior CSIRO architect. Assistant Director of National Biological Standards Laboratory and an
architect and engineer from the Department of Housing and Construction.
Throughout the PWC Inquiry the CSIRO stressed their role as an
operating authority only, with no power to formulate policy.

During

questioning at the PWC Hearing Dr Snowdon stated:
"I think I should make it clear that the
responsibility within the Australian Government for
areas related to animal matters rests either with the
Department of Agriculture or the Department of
Health, depending on the situation. CSIRO has no
executive responsibilities in these areas, no formal
executive responsibilities; it is a research
organisation. We are here, and we have accepted the
responsibility of operating this laboratory - if it
is established - because the other agencies have felt
we are the most appropriate body to operate it."^^^
Dr Allen pointed out that the CSIRO were not responsible for
determining the functions of the laboratory.

He stated:

"... the

functions of the laboratory, as laid down by bodies of that kind [i.e,
AAC and CSVC] were subject to constraint and we have for the moment
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accepted that constraint as being a reasonable one."
Dr Allen later stressed the point that the CSIRO was only an
operating authority and not a policy maker. He stated:
"I think the simplest way of looking at it is to
start with the origins of the proposal. One of the
origins was the AAC and its Standing Committee, and
there was also the CSVC. The AAC, as you know
comprises the Federal Minister for Agriculture and
the State Ministers and the Standing Committee
comprises the senior officers from those bodies.
I suppose looked at in terms of what the impact is
and what industry is involved, one could argue that
the primary executive responsibility really rests
with the Department of Agriculture. It is after all
a primary industry matter, with the Department of
Health having statutory responsibility in certain
quarantine and related areas. The position of CSIRO
is governed by an Act called the Science and Industry
Research Act which defines the organisation and gives
it its functions, which are the undertaking of
research and investigations in connection with, or
for the promotion of, primary and secondary industry.
So we really come into the situation simply as the
operating authority without the policy or executive
responsibility. I think, given that background, you
will understand why yesterday there were a number of
questions which were of a policy nature about which I

could simply state what the policy was, as we
understood it. but we do not have any role in
formulating that policy. So our role is essentially
that of the operating authority." ^^^
Dr Allen also claimed that the initiative to establish ANAHL did not come
from the CSIRO:
"... the initiative in this matter did not come from
CSIRO; it came as I said, from the AAC and the CSVC.
Some of the early history, set out in Dr Pierce's
evidence, I think, clearly demonstrates that. We
have come in - in a sense - as the body thought by
both the Department of Agriculture and the Department
of Health as most appropriate to operate a facility
of this kind if it were established. But the
initiative did not come from us; it came from the
Departments of Health and Agriculture through the
various Commonwealth and State bodies in the fields
in which these two departments operate.

.

Mr Gee also defined the CSIRO's role as administrators and not
policy makers:
"... we are satisfied that CSIRO is the best body to
administer this laboratory. Our department (Health)
will have a role in the determination of policies of
the laboratory on important issues such as, for
example, whether or not it ought to handle foot and
mouth virus. The permanent head of the Department of
Health is a member of the Consultative Committee
which will determine the broad policies and operation
of the laboratory." ^^^
At the ANAHL Forum (August 1982) Dr Boardman (CSIRO Executive
Member) stated: "The CSIRO Executive has made no decision as yet as to
whether there will be a vaccine production facility at ANAHL.

That

decision will be made in the light of an assessment of current
technology." ^^^ When another delegate pointed out to him that a 1982 CSIRO
Booklet stated that ANAHL would produce vaccines Dr Boardman stated:
"There has been no decision by the CSIRO Executive to go ahead with the
vaccine production facility.
next few months.

That issue is to be looked at over the

No decision has been made.

That is the correct

position and I, as a member of the CSIRO Executive, should know what it

These comments would suggest that the CSIRO were involved in
decision making and policy making and not just operators of ANAHL.

Dr

Boardman made no reference to the PWC approval of vaccine production nor
any mention of initiatives from other authorities or consultation with
these policy makers.
The decision was made by November that year.
stated:

The Ferguson fteport

"A vaccine production system for producing killed whole-virus

vaccines is to be installed at ANAHL.
The function of endemic disease research was also one approved by
the PWC, however as a result of controversy, this function was deleted.
The Ferguson Report made it clear that this was a CSIRO decision
apparently without prior approval from the policy making bodies:
"The Committee sees no need to work on indigenous viruses."
Thus it could be concluded that the role of the CSIRO extends
beyond administering and staffing ANAHL.

It would appear that the CSIRO

was involved in some of the early investigations initiating the
establishment of ANAHL and that they have considerable influence in
policy making.
The ambiguous role of the CSIRO is still evident in the most recent
controversy over ANAHL.
News

Dr Wild (Chairman, CSIRO) stated in a recent

Release that "in relation to ANAHL CSIRO acts purely as the agent

of government and it is up to the government and not the CSIRO to decide
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on future policy."

However Mr Barry Jones claimed that "The CSIRO is in

a position of great embarrassment about the future of ANAHL." ^^^

It would

seem significant that Mr Jones mentioned the CSIRO and not the
Department of Primary Industry, the Department of Health, the Bureau of
Animal Health or the AAC, i.e., the initiators and policy makers of
ANAHL.
On the one hand the CSIRO maintain they are not involved in policy
making, yet on the other hand they would appear to take initiatives in
policy making. They apparently had the authority to alter a PWC-approved
function with regard to endemic disease research and to make a fjnal
decision with regard to vaccine production.
Thus there would appear to be a discrepancy between the role the
CSIRO claim they play and the role they actually play with regard
to decision making.
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DISCUSSION
The Arguments
The original purpose of ANAHL was to perform diagnosis and to
produce vaccines in the event of an outbreak of exotic disease.

However

it would seem that once the idea for a maximum security animal health
laboratory was put forward, a number of other functions were promoted as
appropriate undertakings for this laboratory. Thus it would appear that
although the original suggestion to establish ANAHL answered a particular need, later functions were included as additional ways of using the
facility.
This led to two different styles of argument.

The first claimed

that a maximum security animal health laboratory was needed to undertake
diagnosis and vaccine production in a disease outbreak situation, that
is, a need had been recognised and ANAHL provided a means of achieving
the desired ends.

The second group of arguments claimed that if a

maximum security animal health 1aboratory were established, research,
training and quarantine testing could also be undertaken there.

In this

case, a means, namely ANAHL, was already identified and the arguments
concentrated on showing that there was a need to perform these other
functions to achieve other desirable ends.
So the arguments for diagnosis were not concerned with why it was
necessary to do diagnosis as such, but with why ANAHL was needed to do
it, whereas arguments for training, research and quarantine testing
concentrated on justifying the activity rather than arguing that ANAHL
was necessary.

As a result, a criticism common to the arguments

justifying these activities is that they do not demonstrate that a

maximum security animal health laboratory is necessary to train, to
undertake research or even to undertake follow-up testing after an
outbreak has occurred.
It would seem that these subsidiary functions, although not
providing the major reason for the establishment of ANAHL, did provide
additional justification by showing that ANAHL could be usefully
employed outside a disease outbreak situation, and that economic
i

advantages would result which would help underwrite the cost of
establishing and running the facility.
It was argued that a training programme at ANAHL would enable more
veterinary officers to participate in training courses where animals
were infected with the virus, and that this would result in earlier and
more accurate diagnosis of diseases.

This argument was further extended

to claim that a training programme would result in the acceleration of
an eradication campaign and thus reduce economic losses.

So training, it

was argued, provided an on-going function for ANAHL as well as enhancing
Australia's ability to cope with an exotic disease outbreak.
Research also provided a continuous activity for ANAHL and it was
argued that research was essential if competent scientists were to be
attracted and if their interest and expertise were to be retained
between outbreak situations.

In this way research was related to the

major function of diagnosis, but economic arguments justifying research
were also used.

It was claimed that scientific breakthroughs resulting

from research into animal diseases may result in economic advantages to
primary industry in general, and improvements in diagnostic techniques
and disease control methods may facilitate an eradication campaign and

thus reduce the economic losses associated with an outbreak.
Diagnosis was also extended to include quarantine testing, thus
providing another on-going function for ANAHL with economic incentives.
It was argued that the establishment of ANAHL would complement the Cocos
Island Quarantine Station and these two facilities would mean that a
wider variety of livestock could be imported into Australia, thus
providing economic advantages to the livestock industry and hence
Australia's economy in general.

'

Changes in Functions
The increase in the number of functions proposed for ANAHL occurred
during the period of intensive investigation by the CSVC, the IDC, the
AAC Panel and the PET into the need, functions and feasibility of
establishing a maximum security animal health laboratory.
of the functions of

The inclusion

research, training and quarantine testing meant

it was not necessary to rely solely on the arguments of risk of an
outbreak occurring to justify the establishment of ANAHL.

These

functions provided arguments to demonstrate that ANAHL could undertake
useful and economically viable functions between outbreaks, or even if
there were no outbreaks.
All these arguments were presented to and accepted by the PWC.

The

economic viability of ANAHL was accepted on the basis of endemic disease
research alone following the conclusions of the BAE study.
The controversy over the importation of live FMD virus and the
allocation of resources in the early 1980s resulted in the
appropriateness of the functions of ANAHL being re-examined.

A direct

consequence of the resources issue was the elimination of endemic

disease research as a function of ANAHL despite its approval by the PWC.
The debate over the advisability of importing live FMD virus raised
the question of the advisability of producing and using FMD vaccine.
This led to the claim that vaccine production was only a minor function
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of ANAHL

despite its having been included as a function from the

inception of ANAHL and its having influenced the design of ANAHL.
But while vaccine production was reduced to a minor role, quarantine
testing was now emphasized along with its economic advantages.
Report of 1982 highlighted this shift.

The BAH

The functions of ANAHL listed in

it were to:
1.

increase Australia's preparedness to diagnose, control and
eradicate outbreaks of exotic diseases;

2.

facilitate the safe importation of livestock;

and

3.

facilitate the export of livestock and livestock products.^^^

So quarantine testing had become a major function and the other PWCapproved functions were combined into the broad function of diagnosis,
control and eradication.
Collingridge points out that if objectives are stated imprecisely
it is difficult, and often impossible, to criticise those objectives or
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to show that they could have been achieved by other means.

In the

case of ANAHL the contentious areas of vaccination and vaccine
production, training, and research, were subsumed into the general
categories of diagnosis, control and eradication.
Stating the objectives or functions of ANAHL in these general terms
allows a broad interpretation of the means of achieving these
objectives.

Furthermore this interpretation is made by those closely

involved with the operation of ANAHL and is not therefore subject to
public scrutiny in advance of the implementation of the activity.
Collingridge also claims that objectives can be changed to protect
a decision made earlier, or an objective can be invented if the original
objective is no longer satisfactory. ^^^Although quarantine testing was
included as part of the diagnostic function at the PWC Inquiry, it could
be argued that its new prominence constituted a change in objectives.
i

The use of vaccination to control an FMD outbreak had been strongly
criticised and the need to produce FMD vaccine at ANAHL had therefore
been questioned.

The necesssity and safety of infecting animals in

order to train veterinarians had also been criticised, thus bringing
into question the appropriateness of the training function.

Although

the elimination of endemic disease research quelled some opposition, the
question of what constituted appropriate research for ANAHL remained
unanswered.
Quarantine testing provided ANAHL with an on-going function and
one that could be put forward as offering economic advantages.

In view

of the prior approval and establishment of the Cocos Island Quarantine
Station, the promotion of quarantine testing seemed an ideal solution.
However this function was also criticised on the grounds of the danger
involved in importing livestock from high-risk areas and also on
economic grounds.

It was argued that the high cost of importing whole

animals was unnecessary in view of the advances in breeding using ova
and semen.
The most recent criticisms of the functions of ANAHL have called
into question the appropriateness of ANAHL to perform diagnosis, the
major function and reason for the establishment of the facility.

It has

been suggested that a flexible, decentralised approach using mobile onsite units would be preferable to the rigid, centralised approach
offered by ANAHL.
The changing arguments concerning functions appear to be primarily
in response to the changing climate of opinion about ANAHL.

When the

investigations and discussions were limited to the interested parties
and institutions, the range of functions flourished, apparently in.an
attempt to demonstrate the necessity and viability of establishing such
a facility.

However once these functions were challenged in the public

arena, changes and shifts of emphasis were made, apparently to protect
the original decision that there was a need for ANAHL.
Two different responses to these challenges were seen in the
vaccine production function and the research function.

The controversy

over performing research on endemic disease came mainly from within the
CSIRO.

But it could be argued that a more important factor in the

decision to eliminate endemic disease research was that the same
research facilities could be used for a variety of research activities.
Thus the specifics could be easily altered without losing a function.
However, in the case of vaccine production there was no

other

justifiable use for the vaccine production unit incorporated into the
design of ANAHL;

it had already been admitted that CSL could undertake

production of vaccines less virulent than FMD.

Therefore in order to

retain FMD vaccine production as a function, and hence a justification
for the inclusion of a vaccine production unit and for ANAHL itself,
the arguments promoting the need to produce FMD vaccine and the
increased liklihood of using FMD vaccine in Australia were intensified.

Vaccine production was retained as an appropriate function for
ANAHL, although reduced to a minor role, despite public opposition.
Endemic disease research was eliminated despite public approval and
demonstrations of its economic advantages and relevance to the livestock
industry.

These decisions would appear to have been based on political

considerations rather than scientific arguments.

Unwarranted Extensions to Arguments
*

Although training and research were promoted primarily as on-going
functions of ANAHL they were also related to an outbreak situation.

It

was claimed that if training were undertaken by ANAHL, earlier and

more

accurate diagnoses would result and this would reduce the time taken to
control an outbreak and hence reduce economic losses.

Similarly it was

argued that research could result in improved methods of control
which could also mean reduced losses.
The claim that training and research could influence the course of
an outbreak and its subsequent eradication would seem to be an
unwarranted extension of the arguments and evidence presented, and would
appear to ignore the many factors involved.

There is no guarantee that

research could find new methods of control or that these discoveries
could influence the duration of trade bans.

Likewise there was no

evidence to suggest that training, by infecting animals at ANAHL, would
result in earlier detection.

The primary producer, the vital first line

of defence, was not included in the proposed training courses at ANAHL.
At best, early detection could reduce the duration of trade bans
by days, an insignificant effect in view of the losses involved in an
outbreak and the subsequent six to twelve month ban by the main trading

partners.
Although explicitly stating that these various functions would
reduce the economic impact of an outbreak, the evidence about the
liklihood and means of achieving this was extremely vague.

In his

submission to the PWC, Dr Pierce stated "A reduction in lost trading
time of even a few months could represent a gain of millions of dollars
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from agricultural exports'.

However there was no supporting evidence

at the PWC or in subsequent reports that earlier, more accurate Tield or
laboratory diagnosis, new methods of control or vaccination could result
in a reduction of this order.
Both diagnosis and vaccine production were directly concerned with
an outbreak of exotic disease.

The arguments promoting these two

functions, as well as highlighting the inadequacies of the present •
arrangements or other alternatives, also attempted to demonstrate that
economic advantages to Australia would result from ANAHL undertaking
these functions.

It was argued that if diagnosis and vaccine production

were performed at ANAHL this would speed up an eradication campaign and
thus result in a considerable reduction in economic losses.

However

there would appear to be no supporting evidence to substantiate this
extension of argument.
The delay in sending samples for testing to Pirbright could be
measured by the time taken to transport these samples from the outbreak
site to Britain.

According to the evidence, vaccination would only be

used as a last resort when the disease was unable to be controlled by a
slaughter-out programme.

So again the delay would be the time taken to

have supplies of vaccine sent from commercial manufacturers overseas.

If a new strain vaccine was required, no significant difference in the
time to produce it here or overseas would occur.

The potential for

delay in the recognition of the symptoms would appear to be in the
period prior to calling in the authorities.

However even in the Danish

outbreak the delay was less than a week - a far cry from the "few
months" suggested by Dr Pierce's statement.
Although presented as scientific arguments, there appears to be no
evidence for the claims that if ANAHL performs these functions,¿concrete
economic advantages of the order suggested by Dr Pierce would occur.
The use of these arguments would therefore appear to be a political act
which added weight to the justifications of the need for ANAHL to
perform these functions.

A1ternatives
Dr Snowdon, in his evidence to the PWC suggested that the only
alternative to establishing ANAHL was to establish similar facilities
in each of the States.^^^his was not, however, meant to suggest that
such an alternative should be considered, but rather to demonstrate that
there was really no feasible alternative to the establishment of ANAHL.
Alternatives to ANAHL performing particular functions were only presented
at the PWC Inquiry to demonstrate the inadequacies of these
alternatives.
Wynne claims that the evaluation of a single technology without
consideration of viable alternatives is a feature of most technology
assessment.

In this way, Wynne argues, the "more overtly political

question of relative benefits" is avoided.
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The submissions to the PWC did not present alternatives for

assessment but instead advocated a particular technology.

The

institutions concerned had defined their goals and these goals reflected
their perception of needs and their commitments.

The PWC was required

to either reject the proposal, an unlikely outcome in view of the prior
government approval and commitment, or approve it;

they were not

expected to assess or suggest alternatives.
The only alternative presented to the PWC, to ANAHL performing
*

diagnosis, was to rely on Pirbright, and a variety of arguments were used
to demonstrate that this was unsatisfactory.

Similarly it was argued

that Pirbright was the only possible source of vaccine and again this
was claimed to be unsatisfactory.

The limitations and problems

associated with relying on overseas laboratories or overseas outbreaks
*

for training purposes were also pointed out.
In fact it would appear that the arguments advocating that ANAHL
perform these functions were presented in such a way as to
overwhelmingly suggest that there was no viable alternative to ANAHL.
The ASTEC Inquiry, undertaken on their own initiative, did consider
alternatives and recommended that Australia establish "a small ANAHL
research group within an overseas animal health laboratory which has
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access to live FMD virus".

This group would undertake research and

prepare and test diagnostic reagents as well as assist in diagnosis
should the need arise.

The ASTEC Committee also claimed that they were

not convinced that Australia needed to produce vaccine, stating that it
had "not been demonstrated that adequate supplies could not be obtained,
or made under contract, overseas sand to standards
180 of potency and
safety acceptable to Australian authorities."
They also recommended

that training be carried out overseas, "paying for the use of overseas
facilities" if need be.
The ASTEC recommendations and conclusions highlighted some of the
foregone choices concealed in the submissions to the PWC.

The PWC

Committee were dependent on the institutions committed to the
establishment of ANAHL for expert advice and these experts were not
promoting alternatives.

So not only was a consideration of alternatives

outside the PWC'S terms of reference, but also outside their ffeld of
competence given that the problem had already been defined as
scientific.

Counter Arguments
From the previous detailed examination of the arguments used to
justify the individual functions of ANAHL, it can be seen that often it
was not the

opponents who provided the counter arguments to the

justifications but the proponents themselves.
On the question of training, Mr Gee claimed that participation in
major exotic disease outbreaks was the best training
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whereas the CSIRO

183
Ferguson Report claimed this argument was invalid.

The disadvantages

Mr Gee saw in participation in overseas outbreaks was that it was
restricted to just a few people, however the CSIRO saw cost, the limited
disease range and the danger of bringing back the disease as the
disadvantages.

Dr Snowdon saw training in overseas laboratories as

the only alternative to training at ANAHL, but he claimed that this
reliance on overseas laboratories was unsatisfactory
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cost and the sinall numbers who could attend.

because of the

That improved training methods were required was not in dispute,

even by the opponents of training at ANAHL.

What was disputed was the

best way to achieve this training, and on this question there would
appear to be as much disagreement among proponents as between proponents
and opponents.
The arguments presented by the CSIRO justifying endemic disease

•

research were effectively countered by their later decision to eliminate
endemic disease research with no more explanation than it was

.

unjustified.
There were several contradictions with regard to the arguments for
vaccine production.

It was claimed that stockpiling was unsatisfactory

and impractical, yet it was indicated later that ANAHL would be engaged
in stockpiling, and that Britain and USA were both stockpiling vaccines.
The CSIRO argued that other countries may not be prepared to manufacture
vaccines because of the risk associated with the process, if it involved
a type of virus not naturally experienced by them.

However the CSIRO

was advocating that ANAHL produce a wide range of vaccines for
stockpiling despite Australia being free from the disease altogether.
It was claimed following a review of policy in 1979, that it was
now accepted that vaccination might be used as part of an eradication
campaign in Australia because of new methods of control and improvements
186

in vaccines.

This would suggest that the original proposal to

establish a vaccine production unit in 1964 and again in 1970 was
unjustified.
The CSIRO claimed that Pirbright would be unable to perform followup testing and then extended this to suggest that Pirbright was
unsuitable and unreliable for performing initial diagnosis.

However,

elsewhere the CSIRO stated that Pirbright, as a world reference centre,
was committed to establishing an initial diagnosis.
The claim that a diagnostic laboratory would result in faster
diagnosis and hence earlier control is contradicted by the CSIRO
evidence that a slaughter-out programme would be undertaken on the basis
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of clinical symptoms alone without waiting for laboratory confirmation.
A major argument used by the CSIRO at the PWC Inquiry justifying
the establishment of ANAHL was the increasing risk of the introduction
of exotic diseases into Australia, however Mr Gee's evidence at the PWC
conflicted with this view.

Mr Gee claimed at that time that he did not

believe there was an "extremely high risk of the introduction of FMD"
and that he was satisfied that the Quarantine Department could
"effectively maintain [its] existing quarantine

security.also

stated that the greatest risk would come from importing livestock from
disease infected countriesi^°However by 1982 Mr Gee had apparently
altered his assessment and now claimed that "quarantine could no longer
completely protect Australia"^^^and that there was no "real risk or any
high risk at all of FMD being introduced into Australia with live
animals".^^^
Mazur maintains that disputes between experts indicate that
interpretations and value judgements play a significant part in
"scientific" evidence.^^^ When these disputes occur between opponents
and proponents, the differences tend to be ascribed to basic differences
in values and definitions of social need.

However contradictions and

counter-arguments among proponents would suggest a more explicit
political dimension, and the use of a particular argument at a particular
time could be ascribed to political expediency.
*

*

*

*

*

The changes in arguments, the shifts, the unwarranted extensions
and the contradictions all suggest that facts alone do not determine the
basis for decision-making.

Thus it would appear that value-judgments

and political considerations play an important role both in the
informational and decision-making aspects of technology assessment.
i

The power of experts, through their access to specialised
knowledge, allows them to define arguments as scientific and often to
define their expertise.

In this way important decisions of problem

definition, data selection, collection and assessment have already been
made before the formal assessment procedure.
By defining decision-making as scientific and technology assessment
as fact-finding, the political nature of decisions and value-judgements
and uncertainties are concealed.
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CHAPTER FIVE
THE SELECTION OF THE SITE

THE SELECTION OF THE SITE
The PWC conclusion that the site selected was suitable gives no
indication of the concern shown by some members of the PWC about the
choice of the Geelong Rifle Range site.

One of the reasons for their

concern was the apparent reversal of an earlier decision.

The

CSIRO Report of May 1973 stated: "it is recommended that Geelong should
not be selected for the location of the National Animal Health
*

Laboratory in preference to any of the sites recommended in
Melbourne, Canberra, Brisbane or Sydney"^

and "the four capital city

sites are considered superior to the island sites, Geelong or country
sites.

This decision was arrived at after examining all of the scientific

and technical factors likely to affect the microbiological security and
efficient functioning of the laboratory and it is believed that these
factors should override all other considerations in influencing the
2

choice of site."
However, by September 1974, Geelong was promoted as being the most
suitable site for ANAHL.
In its report of August 1972, the PET concluded that the ideal site
for an animal health laboratory should be:
about 25 to 30 acres in extent and preferably of similar dimensions
in both directions
located on ground with sound load bearing qualities for building
structural purposes
accessible to all major urban services such as power, water,
sewerage and gas
remote from susceptible livestock (cattle, sheep, pigs and goats)

by half a mile, preferably one mile.

This would mean being remote

not only from farms but also from racecourses, showgrounds,
abattoirs and saleyards
within reasonable distance of a major university containing well
established departments of microbiology and biochemistry.

There

would also be some advantage in being close to a university with a
veterinary school
within reasonable distance of other tertiary education
establishments, such as a major technical college
within a city containing a major airport to ensure rapid transport
of specimens and materials should an outbreak of an exotic disease
occur in a part of the country remote from the laboratory
within a reasonable distance of residential areas
It was also considered preferable that the Laboratory be located as
close as possible to the centre of gravity of the Australian livestock
industry and to the mainstream of primary industry research in
Australia. ^
The Cabinet Submission of October 1972 made no reference to possible
sites for the Laboratory, but Cabinet noted the view that consideration
might be given to a site in a country centre.

The PET reexamined the

situation but reiterated its original conclusion that there were severe
disadvantages and no particular advantage in such a decision.
In

order to locate a site which fulfilled the requirements of

the

PET Report, the CSIRO and the Commonwealth Department of Works, with the
assistance
extensive

of

other

departments

and

authorities,

carried

investigation which looked at eight sites in both

New

out

an

South

Wales and Victoria, five in Queensland, including two island sites, four
in
The

the

Australian Capital Territory,

conclusions

and a possible site at

reached by this team were that the four

Geelong.

capital

sites identified by them were superior to the island sites,

city

Geelong

or

country sites.^
As well as having the general disadvantages of country or regional
centres identified by PET, ^ Geelong did not meet the specific
requirements of isolation from susceptible livestock, community pf
interest associations and proximity to an international standard
airport.
Meanwhile, in December 1972, the Director of the Geelong Regional
Planning Authority and the Executive Chairman of the Geelong Promotion
Committee made representations to the Victorian Premier and his Deputy
to put the case that Geelong, and the state as a whole, would benefit if
ANAHL was established in Geelong:

"It was put to the Premier that

Geelong's selection as a site for the laboratory would be greatly
enhanced if the fourth University of Victoria was to be located in the
Geelong Region."^

In 1973 the Geelong Region was selected as the site

for Victoria's fourth University.
In June 1973, the CSIRO's Proposal for a National Animal Health
Laboratory, document of May 1973 was considered by the Ministers for
Science, Primary Industry, Health and Northern Development.

They agreed

to support the proposal but requested that the final choice of a site be
made by the Minister for Urban and Regional Development.®
1973 Geelong was designated as a regional growth centre.

In August
In its sub-

mission to the PWC, the Geelong Regional Planning Authority stated:
"This decision [i.e., the decision in August that Geelong be designated

a regional growth centre] led to Geelong being re-examined as a possible
site for the Laboratory, and in fact, meetings with the Director of the
Geelong Regional Planning Authority reopened in June 1973." ^
This meant that only a month after the CSIRO Report recommending
against the selection of Geelong, meetings were being held with the
Geelong Regional Planning Authority.

Within three months of the CSIRO

Report, Geelong had been selected as the site for the fourth Victorian
University and had been designated a regional growth centre.
Ten possible sites were located in Geelong but the initial
inspection of the Rifle Range site in June 1973 "suggested that the site
would not be appropriate because of hydraulic and structural
10
difficulties".

The Geelong Regional Planning Authority submission goes

on to say that: "The GRPA, whilst anxious to see the Laboratory
established in the Geelong Region, did not put the Rifle Range forward
for investigation at an early date because it was aware of the limited
amount of Corio Bay Foreshore currently or potentially available for
community recreation.

However, because no other alternative location

seemed to be possible in Geelong, the selection of the Rifle Range as
the site for the ANAHL has the unanimous support of the Authority." ^^
Once the Rifle Range site at Geelong had been identified, the CSIRO
and the Department of Works undertook an environmental impact study and
produced their report in October 1973.

This report along with the joint

submission from the Ministers for Science, Health, Primary Industry and
Northern Development, formed the basis of the Government's decision in
April 1974 to build the Laboratory at Geelong on the Rifle Range site.
It would seem that between May 1973, when the CSIRO published its

report recommending against Geelong, and October 1973, when the National
Animal Health Laboratory Environmental Impact Study was published, a
number of important and significant actions were taken which resulted in
Geelong being selected.
In the CSIRO submission to the PWC it states that Geelong did not
meet the PET requirements, "as to isolation from susceptible livestock
12
and this was regarded by the working group as a severe disability",
the 1973 CSIRO Report also listed Geelong as not meeting the

yet

'

requirements of proximity to an international airport and community of
interest associations.

The PET Report considered that a livestock
free
13

zone around the Laboratory was not essential to its security

and in fact

designed ANAHL so that microbiological security would not be dependent
upon its location, but it did stress the importance of it being
close to
14
a major airport for the rapid transportation of specimens.
Mr Bonnett (PWC Member) began the questioning of the site decision
with the statement: "I am not happy with the determination of the site."^^
He pointed out that the four sites in the major cities were recommended
ahead of Geelong and that Geelong had no university, a requirement of
the PET recommendations.

He stated:

"While the site is reserved for a

university, it is only probable that one will be built in the near
future."^^He continued:
"I am sure there are suitable sites in other centres,
too, that are about the same driving time away from a
major airport where there are established universities.
I want to know what makes the Geelong site
more desirable than those sites in other centres,
especially when we figure that our heavily populated
stock area and our major export stock area is north
of the Tropic of Capricorn, for instance.
I would
like to know what makes the Geelong site more desirable. We have not had this comparison given to us at
any stage of the game in any of the evidence.

Senator Jessop continued this line of questioning: "Yesterday Mr
Bonnett asked, 'Are you [i.e. the CSIRO] happy with the site?' and I
think you said, 'I think it is satisfactory.' Does that really mean that
you are hysterical about it?"

Dr Allen (CSIRO) replied:

that it means that it is a satisfactory site.

"I just think

It does not go beyond

18
that."

Senator Jessop also stated:

"It appeared to me to be an

afterthought that Geelong was included." ^^
Mr Keogh then joined in;

i

he stated "In spite of the extensive

nature of the questioning from Mr Bonnett and others, I am still
persuaded that CSIRO is not completely and absolutely satisfied that
20
this is the best site."
major airpor^^

Mr Keogh also pointed out that Geelong lacked a

and a university with a veterinary school. ^^

Senator Poyser asked: "Of all the sites considered is Geelong the
site that will create the least inconvenience to residential areas?"^^
However Dr Allen claimed that it was impossible to answer that in
absolute terms.
Dr Allen had previously suggested that Geelong had the advantage of
being a Commonwealth property, which would mean that delays and
24

complications could be avoided.

In answer to Senator Poyser's question

Dr Allen admitted that the site in Melbourne and the one in Brisbane
were also owned by the Commonwealth,
and that neither of these involved
25
the demolition of any property.
Dr Allen of the CSIRO gave extensive answers, covering several pages
of evidence, to most of the questions on siting.

However these answers

were repetitious and concentrated on the history of the decision and not
on the reason for the decision.

He stated:

"To sum up, I cannot answer

explicitly your question as to why the four Ministers decided that the
Laboratory had to be part of the region's growth centre.

Nor can I

provide you with information as to what decided the Cities Commission to
recommend Geelong.

We were the recipients of both of those pieces of

advice under Ministerial direction." ^^
Mr McVeigh (PWC Member) asked twice for a resume of the discussions
between the CSIRO and the Cities Commission,^^ but was told by the
Chairman of the PWC that it was "a matter the Committee will take up at
a later stage".
It would appear that at least some members of the PWC were not
satisfied with the selection of Geelong Rifle Range site.

However the

conclusion that it was a suitable site was reached despite their
reservations and criticisms.
information

The Committee was not provided with full

on how or why Geelong was selected, nor were they given the

choice of an al ternative. si te.

The terms of the inquiry would appear

to be such that an approval of the establishment of ANAHL implied the
automatic approval of the site and no provision was made for the
rejection of the Geelong site.
It could be concluded that the PWC Inquiry, rather than
investigating the suitability of the site, applied a stamp of legitimacy
to decisions made elsewhere.
A CSIRO publication Questions and Answers (undated) stated "the
suitability of the Rifle Range site and the possible environmental
effects of ANAHL was scrutinised at a public inquiry undertaken in
Geelong in September 1974 by the Parliamentary Standing Committee on
Public Works.
was suitable."

That committee concluded ... that the Rifle Range site
This brochure also claimed:

"Geelong was chosen for the

Australian National Animal Health Laboratory because the site - the old
Geelong Rifle Range - is the best in Australia. The site was selected
ahead of about forty others looked at all over Australia and after
consideration of an exhaustive environmental impact statement."^^

This

claim, that Geelong was selected because it was "the best site in
Australia" would seem to be an unsupported extension of the PWC conclusion that the site was "suitable".
The PET Report identified a number of requirements that were
considered necessary for the site of ANAHL.

On the basis of these

criteria, Geelong was not judged the most suitable site and in fact
specific disadvantages were identified.

The selection of Geelong would

appear to have been based on considerations other than scientific ones,
and although the PWC appeared to recognise this, they did not question
its legitimacy.

Indeed it could be argued that the scientific evidence

submitted supporting Geelong was used to conceal the political nature of
the decision.
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CONCLUSION

CONCLUSION
The PWC Inquiry stands out as a central feature in the history of
the establishment of ANAHL.

It was depicted as an extensive

investigation and assessment of the proposal to establish ANAHL, and the
conclusions and recommendations contained in the PWC Report became
authoritative statements and were used as justifications for later
decisions.
However an examination of the decision-making process would'suggest
that the need for ANAHL had been established well before the PWC
Inquiry, and that the purpose of the inquiry was to legitimate this
decision rather than assess the technology.
Conrad points out that assessments of technology generally perform
a legitimating function ^ and Wynne adds that past commitments and '
values influence the present values and assessments.

Thus it becomes

important to look, not only at decision making by the PWC, but to
consider the investigations and decisions which led to this inquiry.
The AAC in 1970, on the basis of the CSVC and IDC Reports, had
agreed that a need for ANAHL existed, and subsequent investigations
concentrated on the feasibility of establishing a maximum security
animal health laboratory, the functions it should perform and where it
should be situated.

By 1972 the Commonwealth Government had agreed in

principle to the establishment of ANAHL and recommended that $200,000 be
made available to complete design specifications.

Five months prior to

the PWC Inquiry the Government approved the establishment of ANAHL on
the Geelong Rifle Range site, agreed to the formation of a Consultative
Committee to assist in the management of ANAHL, approved documentation

of the project by the Department of Housing and Construction, and noted
that the recurrent costs would be additional to the CSIRO's budget
requirements.
So the major decisions would appear to have been made prior to the
PWC Inquiry.

However, the establishment of ANAHL was not a neutral or

inevitable decision, but an outcome of particular choices.

And these

choices had been made by institutions committed to the establishment of
ANAHL.

It was the advocates of ANAHL who defined the decision making

problem, as well as gathered, selected and evaluated the evidence.
This control over information can be used to influence or
predetermine decisions^

and Wynne points out that technical

intelligence is "also political intelligence to the (often very large)
extent that it
a)

influences the allocation of resources and benefits and costs
between different social sectors an interests, and

b)

legitimates the power of institutions and interests of various
sorts."^
Control over knowledge also allows these groups to define the

decision making as scientific and thereby increases their control since
governments come to rely on their expertise.
The fact that the CSVC and IDC made similar recommendations gave
added credence and authority to both.

That the PET Report took two years

to prepare, included visits to overseas laboratories,

was obviously

costly and required six volumes to contain its findings, added to the
authority of its recommendations and reduced the chance of these being
challenged.

So each report lent its authority to a subsequent report

and as a result made it more difficult to challenge the original basis
for the decision.

Thus the number of investigations and reports and the

large commitments in terms of time and money, would appear to have a
cumulative effect on the authority of the decision reached.
The initiative to establish ANAHL did not cone from the government;
both the need and the means of fulfilling that need were defined by the
CSYC, the IDC, the AAC and the PET.

As a result the reports from these

groups became vehicles of advocacy rather than assessment.

However none
i

of these groups presented evidence at the PWC Inquiry although their
recommendations were used as part of the CSIRO submission.

It would

seem that the CSIRO had taken on the role of these groups, becoming both
expert and advocate.
As discussed previously, there appeared to be a discrepancy between
the role the CSIRO said it played with regard to decision making, and
the role it actually played.

Although claiming to be merely

administrators and operators of ANAHL, it would seeni that the CSIRO had
been involved in early decision making through its membership of various
committees, and continued to make decisions about the proposed
functions, the site and the design of ANAHL.

But as well as this, there

would appear to be a discrepancy between the expe'^tise claimed by the
CSIRO and its actual expertise.

Some of their arguments relied on the

authority of these earlier reports, but they also held themselves out as
experts in areas of quarantine, economics and risK and safety
assessment.

The PWC accepted the CSIRO arguTr;ents about the risk of an

exotic disease entering Australia rather than the Quarantine
Department's assessment;

they accepted their argirments that the various

functions could provide economic advantages, and that the site was

suitable and the microbiological security was adequate.

Thus it would

appear that the CSIRO had defined a wide range of areas "scientific" and
had defined themselves as experts in these areas and these definitions
were accepted by the PWC without question.
No alternative to the establishment of a maximum security animal
health laboratory was considered in the reports prior to the PWC and the
evidence submitted to the PWC was presented in such a way as to suggest
that there was no feasible alternative to ANAHL.

In this way tf choice

between alternatives, and the political and value judgements that this
implied, was avoided.
ANAHL was proposed as a means of protecting Australia's livestock
industry in the event of an outbreak of exotic disease, and Collingridge
claims that when goals are stated imprecisely it becomes difficult.to
criticise the proposed means of achieving these goals and show that this
may not be the most effective way of realising the objective.^

Not

until the recent controversies, was the establishment of ANAHL
criticised and alternatives put forward.
In the arguments justifying the proposed functions of ANAHL,
alternatives were given, but only to highlight their inadequacies.

The

PWC were told that Pirbright may be unreliable for primary diagnosis and
would be unable to perform the necessary follow-up testing after an
outbreak was confirmed.

It was also claimed that Pirbright was the only

safe source of vaccine but that there were many drawbacks in relying on
this source.

Although current training involved attendance at overseas

courses and outbreaks, this was said to be unsatisfactory because of the
limited numbers who could attend and the cost involved.

So the PWC were

not given any real alternatives to ANAHL performing the various
functions.

The submissions suggested that all alternatives had been

investigated but rejected as unsuitable, and this was accepted by the
PWC.
As well as arguing that ANAHL was the only way these ftinctions
could be effectively undertaken, the proponents also argued that these
functions would provide an on-going function for ANAHL between outbreak
situations and would result in economic advantages.

i

The arguments promoting the various functions were presented as
"scientific" arguments, however no experts outside those committed to
the establishment of ANAHL were involved in presenting or assessing the
evidence.

Thus it could be argued that evidence was selected to support

a particular commitment.

Furthermore, the changes in arguments, the

unwarranted extensions of arguments and the contradictions would suggest
that political factors played an important part in the evidence selected
and presented as well as in the assessment of the evidence.
As well as reflecting the perceptions and values of the proponents,
the arguments used to justify the proposed functions also reflected the
prevailing social attitudes.

The need for ANAHL was initially

established purely for coping with an outbreak situation.

During the

period when government approval was sought, further justifications were
added to demonstrate ANAHL's viability and usefulness both during and
outside an outbreak.

Questioning of the functions did not begin until

after building had commenced and at this stage the arguments appeared
to shift towards convincing the primary producers that economic
advantages would result from the operation of ANAHL even without an
outbreak.
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The justifications for ANAHL were presented to the PWC as factual
and objective evidence and accepted as such, and the man/value
judgements,

uncertainties and assumptions were overlooked or concealed.

The arguments of need relied heavily on the assertion that there
was an increasing risk of an outbreak of an exotic disease.

However the

perception of risk and the assessment of the degree of risk are not
objective "scientific" activities, but depend on interpretations and
val ue judgements.

Although this was demonstrated by Mr Gee's evidence

which conflicted with the CSIRO's argument of the increasing danger of
an outbreak, it was overlooked by the PWC.
Thus it can be seen that both the informational and decision making
aspects of technology assessment are value laden.

The CSIRO and the

Quarantine Department gave different interpretations of the risks of an
outbreak, which would appear to reflect their commitments.

This would

seem to be substantiated by the change in Mr Gee's assessment of risk
when he no longer represented the Quarantine Department.
The PWC on the other hand selected the information it considered
relevent.

The selection of the CSIRO's evidence over the contradictory

claims of the Quarantine Department would appear to substantiate the
claim that the function of the PWC was to legitimate the decision that a
need for ANAHL existed.
The selection of the Geelong Rifle Range site had already been
approved by the Government in April 1974 and so again it could be argued
that the function of the PWC was to legitimate a decision that had
already been made.
The arguments supporting the Geelong site were presented as the

results of extensive scientific investigations.

However the extensive

scientific investigations had one year earlier recommended that Geelong
should not be selected.

In this case it was not new scientific evidence

and information that became available that altered this recommendation,
but direct political intervention.

Although Dr Allen of the CSIRO

initially tried to justify the choice of Geelong on scientific grounds, '
with continued questioning he admitted that it was a political decision,
and one which he claimed the CSIRO was not a party to.

;

It would seem that once the decision was made, scientific
justifications were developed to conceal the political nature of the
choice.

Although the PWC was aware of the discrepancies In the

evidence, it was unwilling or unable to reject the choice of Geelong.
Again no viable alternative was presented for consideration, and, given
that the selection of Geelong was made at a Ministerial level and that
the Government had already approved this, the PWC appeared to have no
alternative but to agree that the site was suitable.
Throughout all the arguments justifying the need for ANAHL and the
need to perform its proposed functions, was the suggestion of the
economic advantages that would result.

However the BAE cost benefit

study, which was prepared for the PWC Inquiry, provided the first and
only formal study of the economic viability of ANAHL.

On the basis of

this study the PWC concluded that ANAHL was economically justified.
However an examination of this study revealed that it was based on
questionable assumptions, used questionable methods of calculation and
examples and contained a high degree of uncertainty.
The uncertainties and value judgements contained in the study were
overlooked.

As Wynne has noted.

"expertise and authority can be 'negotiated' by
controlling information about uncertainties or
conflicting points of view and even by outlawing
critical questions and pretending that decisions are
based upon sophisticated technical forecasting and
similar calculations, as opposed to structurally
'given' presumptions and guesswork." ^
Furthermore an examination of the Minutes of Evidence revealed that
the PWC did not investigate or assess the report itself but accepted its
validity on the basis of the credibility and reputation of the
institution who prepared the report.

The claim that ANAHL was econom-

ically justified became an authoritative statement which was not
challenged.
Technology assessment, by the very nature of technology, involves
dealing with uncertainty, since the full "factual" consequences cannot
be known.

Added to this, technology assessment has been defined as'

scientific, thus experts are relied upon to present and evaluate the
arguments.

Wynne argues that the increasing complexity and scientific

nature of technology and the inevitable unforeseeable consequences have
resulted in the assessment of the institutions which appear to control
the technology.^

If decision-makers and the general public are unable

to evaluate the technology itself, then the credibility and
trustworthiness of the decision-making processes and institutions is
evaluated instead:

"Questions of public trust, credibility, openness

and significantly, the past track record in these respects, become the
8

key factors in framing social attitudes."

Wynne claims that this is

"perhaps the major component of the social assessment of technology,
putting into 9very minor perspective the fact-finding model of such
decisions."

Although the proposals to establish ANAHL involved a joint
submission by the Department of the Health, the Department of Primary
Industry and the CSIRO, the CSIRO emerged as the responsible
institution.

The arguments put forward by the CSIRO were continually

justified on scientific grounds and the uncertainties and valuejudgements concealed.

Furthermore it has been argued here that the PWC

provided little more than a ritual legitimation of decisions made by the
institutions committed to the establishment of ANAHL.

'

An examination of the decision-making involved in the establishment
of ANAHL would appear to verify Wynne's claim that:

"expertise and

authority can be 'negotiated' by concealing uncertainties and value
judgements and by claiming that decisions are based on objective
scientific evidence."

Although this situation may facilitate

decision-making in the short term, Wynne maintains that eventually it is
counter productive when the falsification is revealed:

"attempts to

gain authority on specific decisions and issues by using spurious images
of certainty, gives rise to a greater and more general loss of authority
by the institutions as a whole when that image is eventually punctured,
as they nearly always are."^^
A recent article in The Bulletin claimed that "the CSIRO has been
transformed from a great Australian institution into the subject of
sometimes strong criticism" and that "the CSIRO has blown its scientific
infallibility". ^^

Barry Jones stated

in Parliament that "the CSIRO is

in a position of great embarrassment about the future of ANAHL.
These statements would suggest that the CSIRO has lost some of its
authority and credibility as a result of the controversy surrounding the
establishment of ANAHL.
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